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Program Overview
The Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies organized and held its fourth annual
National Space Forum from 1-2 September 2009 in Washington, DC. Panels at the Forum
discussed security issues and space. Specific topics of discussion included an assessment of
security challenges and threats in the space domain, the role of space deterrence in national
policy, the potential for new approaches to arms control and verification, improving international
cooperation with allies in Asia and Europe, a discussion of China’s role in space, and
implementation of national space policy in the Obama Administration. The Forum concluded
with discussions on how to integrate often competing interests into a more cohesive policy, and,
more importantly, improve the chances that such a policy can be effectively implemented. Forum
panels represented a variety of points of view from the security, civil, and commercial space
sectors. Each panelist presented opening remarks to identify key issues and concepts that were
discussed among the group of panelists.
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Threat Assessments and the Space Domain
This session focused on risks in relation to the
space domain, and the issue of how
government resources should be applied to
address risks. The point was made that the
focus on threat assessments should be on
looking for the most probable risks – since
9/11 the focus has been to identify all possible
risks, and this is
problematic as resources What is
are inadequate for this missing is a
approach.
What
is political
missing is a political
context for
context
for
threat
assessments. It is the job threat
of the military to assessments.
consider all threats – to
think of worst-case scenarios and to explore
how to counter threats. But in this calculation,
how much threat can you afford? Given
resource constraints, trade-offs are needed.
How you prioritize the threats and mitigation
options are key issues to consider. The
prioritization of risks, threats, and mitigation
options is complicated by a number of factors
and trends indentified and discussed in this
session.
First, current assessments suggest that there
are not imminent threats to space capabilities.
Will this change? Will there be challenges
from the rise of China as a space power or the
resurgence of Russia as one?
Second, China is not as dependent on space as
the United States (U.S.). For example, China
carries 10% to 20% of telecommunications by
satellite compared to more than 80% for the
U.S. military. This creates a vulnerability gap
for the U.S. The key question in this regard is
the extent to which the gap will, or will not,
narrow? The U.S. has no concept of how this
vulnerability will be overcome. U.S. global

reach has implications – this makes the U.S.
dependent on space assets, and space assets
are integrated into training, operational
processes, and warfighting for the U.S.
military. At the same time, as China further
develops and integrates space assets for its
own military use and security, China will
emerge as more vulnerable and the
vulnerability gap will likely narrow.
Third, space technology is dual-use. The U.S.
Global Positioning System (GPS) is a good
example of dual-use space technology. Dualuse is very often based on context; in other
words, dual-use exists when there is demand
for such use. A political context for dual-use is
missing; where do you draw the line on dualuse? For example, are Chinese commercial
telecommunication satellites (comsats) for
military use, and is China’s human spaceflight
program
linked
to
ballistic
missile
development?
Fourth, there is the tendency to exaggerate the
capabilities of the other side in the dynamic of
threat assessments. The dynamic is reinforced
through
insecurity,
…global misperception, and
proliferation of miscommunication. In
space fact, these dynamics
technology characterize current
space
makes the U.S.-China
relations. Dialogue is
threat
essential to offset
assessment these issues, similar to
calculation not the dialogue that
just about the existed during the
U.S. and China. Cold War between the
U.S. and the Soviet
Union that developed
common understandings between the two
powers.
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Fifth, the global proliferation of space
technology makes the threat assessment
calculation not just about the U.S. and China.
For example, there is Iran and the Middle East
as well as South America and Brazil as
emergent space powers. Many countries spend
money for commercial and security purposes,
and space plays an increasing role in those
pursuits. In many ways, there is a global space
race with regional rivalries. India, for
example, is thinking of kinetic energy AntiSatellite (KE-ASAT) tests as a result of the
Chinese ASAT test. Such a development
would, in turn, spawn Pakistan to challenge
India. Each space power has a different
strategic outlook and orientation that must be
considered in threat assessments.
Sixth, in relation to the issue of space
technology, the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR) regime of the U.S.
Government is an
internal threat to the …strategic
U.S. This is a result of thinking is
the
dysfunctional essential to
nature
of
export address U.S.
control policies and
laws. ITAR is an vulnerability
example of “fear- due to a
based” security. The dependence on
approach with ITAR space assets.
and export controls of
space technologies demonstrates a lack of
strategic thinking related to space.
Seventh, strategic thinking is essential to
address U.S. vulnerability due to a
dependence on space assets. There is no good
implementation plan for space policy in the
U.S. Plausible solution sets for the U.S.
include: respond to, replace (Operationally
Responsive Space), and mitigate (space
control, space deterrence, counterspace);
cooperation (rules of the road, multilateral
engagement) and diplomacy backed-up by
capability; and leadership based on shaping
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the governance environment with rules of the
road, codes of conduct, KE-ASAT test ban
practices and no KE-ASAT first use policy
and declaration. Also, the U.S. does not
adequately look beyond building, designing,
and funding space assets. Structurally and
organizationally the U.S. deals with space in
the wrong way for optimal outcomes. The
U.S. cannot afford to be confident in the
continued use of space assets as it currently
exists, and the U.S. will likely be surprised by
the space capabilities of other space powers.
Lastly, deterrence is critical to think of as one
key mitigation option. Space deterrence is not
an issue of hard versus soft power, but one of
a spectrum of power elements. In other words,
deterrence must be placed within the context
of strategic thinking. Yet to deter is hard, as
different agendas and different interests
among states and space powers complicates
the threat assessment landscape.

6
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Space Deterrence and National Policy
The opening remarks for this session began
with a review of the Space Deterrence Study
recently completed (August 2009) by the
Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense
Studies and published in Space and Defense 3:
1 (2009). This review was followed by brief
discussion of peer reviews and commentaries
of the Deterrence Study, also published in
Space and Defense 3: 1 (2009).

Administration specifically identified space as
a key enabler and enhanced space capabilities
as critical to solving major practical
challenges now facing U.S. security – global
security issues and concerns; economic
stimulus and industrial base; environment and
climate; and workforce and employment. This
recognition by the Obama Administration
shows the importance of space and why
stability in space ought to be of the highest
national priority.

Discussion
The U.S. should make smarter strategic
decisions since we have the kind of space
capabilities that enables us to make military
decisions on a board strategic level. For the
U.S., more than any other space power, it is
essential that a stable and predictable space
environment is maintained for the continued
use
of
space-based
information services to Despite the
support strategic and importance
tactical decisions. A of space
doctrine to encourage
deterrence,
space deterrence is the
best way forward in this the concept
regard. A stable deterrent has not had
environment is possible sufficient
when capability exists, attention.
when there is political
will and the credibility to leverage capability
for deterrent ends, and when strategic
communications are effective for fostering a
shared understanding of deterrence.
Despite the importance of space deterrence,
the concept has not had sufficient attention. A
conflict in space, or one that affects space
assets, is more harmful to the U.S. than to
others given U.S. dependence on space assets.
It is encouraging, nonetheless, that the Obama

There were a number of questions raised and
issues discussed in this session in relation to
space deterrence. To begin with, how do we
ensure the maintenance of the global
commons of space? For this end, we need to
find a way to meaningfully collaborate to
create a stable and predictable space
environment.1 Deterrence by international
norm or entanglement can be one strategy for
this end. Can you create an approach to space
deterrence that is inclusive of all spacefaring
entities? Can norms based on rules of the road
for space accomplish this approach to
deterrence? Concomitantly, if you decide to
collaborate and share, what new risks emerge?
On the other hand, what are the implications
for the global commons of space if we choose
not to collaborate in the space domain? By
definition, have we created conflict and
competitors in the space domain? Does that
domain become a contested one?

1

Panelists agreed that shared space situational awareness is a
good way forward for space deterrence and to demonstrate
global leadership for the U.S.
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It was noted that strategic communications are
missing from the deterrence equation as there
is no fundamental shared understanding of
deterrence.
The
Schreiver
Wargames
demonstrated that
even within the …strategic
United
States communications
Government and are missing from
among allies there
the deterrence
is not a shared
understanding of equation as there
deterrence. This is is no fundamental
more problematic shared
with adversaries. understanding of
For example, how deterrence.
will we develop
shared understandings with the Chinese?
There is the need for clarity and exactitude of
language to reach a shared understanding.
This can be accomplished by dialogue with
the Chinese on space issues.
Panelists remarked that very few space powers
have the motive and capability to attack U.S.
space assets. The focus tends to be on China.
As such, has Russia been overlooked in the
dialogue on space deterrence and threat
assessment? Russia is a re-emergent space
power
that
has
reconstituted
space
capabilities. This needs to be watched by the
U.S., but there is no real trigger or flash point
with Russia, like the Taiwan issue with China.
Also, Russia collaborates with the U.S. in
space. Of note as well, are other potential
threats and challenges to U.S. space assets.
Today, any state can buy their way into space
capability through commercial space assets.
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International Cooperation in Asia and Europe
The Obama Administration put forward a new
focus on international cooperation that is more
multilateral, where the U.S. listens to friends
and allies, but where friends and allies are
expected to bear their fair share of the burden.
Panelists in this session identified four factors
important to foster space cooperation: (1)
cooperation must be credible in that there is
political will and the proposed cooperation
offers something of value to each partner; (2)
the collaborative arrangements should
demonstrate a cost (burden to be
accomplished) and benefit (value) to each
partner; (3) cooperation should build national
capacity; and (4) cooperation should be based
on open communications between the
partners.
The focus of this session was on the issue of
international space cooperation regarding
Japan and South East Asia, and on space
security cooperation between Europe and the
U.S. Also, India and Australia were identified
as important space powers in regard to space
cooperation in Asia, given Australia’s
cooperation with the U.S. on the Wide-Ban
Global Satellite Communications System
(WGS) and the evolving Indian-U.S. strategic
relationship.
Japan
The Japanese perspective on international
space cooperation is framed by new
approaches to space diplomacy in Japan and
by the reform of Japanese space organizations.
First, in regard to space diplomacy, the new
Japanese Basic Law for Space Activities was
established in May 2008 and enforced in
August of the same year. According to the
Basic Law, a new Minister and a new

Strategic Headquarters were established for
space activities. And in June of 2009, the
Strategic Headquarters announced the new
Japanese Basic Plan for Space Activities.
Since launching sounding rockets to support
the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of
1957-1958, Japan has promoted international
space cooperation. Actually, Japan realized
various kinds of international space programs
with the United States,
…Japan Europe, Canada, Russia,
can and
AsianPacific
promote countries.
However,
human Japanese space activities
security in have not been linked with
developing diplomatic policies. This
is the case because Japan
countries. has had no coordination
between its space and diplomatic policies. The
new Basic Plan stipulates that Japan should
advance both “space activities for diplomacy”
and “diplomacy for space activities.”
Space activities for diplomacy imply the use
of space to accomplish diplomatic purposes.
For example, Japan could take better
advantage for this end with the International
Space Station program, with the Asia-Pacific
Disaster Management Support System through
the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency
Forum, and with the Asia-Pacific Space
Cooperation Organization.1
1

The Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, under the
initiative of Japan, is an agency-level forum to promote
regional space utilization. The Asia-Pacific Space
Cooperation Organization, under the initiative of China, is an
intergovernmental organization to promote collaborative
space programs. Although the two organizations are different,
it was noted during this panel that there is the need for Japan
to dialogue with China about compatibility between regional
cooperative space efforts in the near future.
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In the area of diplomacy for space activities,
Japan could make better use of Official
Development Assistance to help develop
countries through space cooperation. By
offering assistances and services through its
advanced space science and technology
capabilities, Japan can promote human
security in developing countries. Japan could
also be more active in the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space and in the United Nations Conference
on Disarmament to promote diplomacy for
space activities.
United States – European
Space Security Cooperation
Space and security cooperation between
Europe and the U.S. is limited given
differences
in
priorities,
capabilities,
resources, and differences at the normative
level. Nevertheless, a window of opportunity
for transatlantic space
cooperation between …security and
Europe and the U.S defense are a
exists – there is a re-affirmed
need to address the priority at the
global context of
European
space internationally,
and
there
exist level.
opportunities
for
building military space cooperation in areas of
operational management, space debris, rules
of road, and codes of conduct.
Furthermore, security and defense are a reaffirmed priority at the European level. The
limited use of space for security was part of
the past trend in Europe due to the lack of
integration across national-based security
approaches. This is now changing with role of
the European Union (EU) and the European
Defense Agency (EDA) in space activities,
and programs, such as Global Monitoring for
Environment and Security (GMES) and
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Galileo. Also, the European Space Agency
(ESA) is beginning to make contributions to
the space component of common European
defense and security, and recently adopted
programs that deal with security, like SSA for
example. In the SSA area, Europe is seeking
to develop autonomous systems and to
contribute with those systems to global SSA
capability. U.S. military leaders are supportive
of these European initiatives.
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Military-Civil-Commercial Space Cooperation
This session addressed space cooperation
across military, civil, and commercial space
sectors by examining what is working, what
are the obstacles, and what would you change.
Following this, the discussion assessed the
utility of national space strategy – do we need
a national space strategy and strategy for what
– to advance cooperation among the space
sectors.
What is Working
Panelists stated that R&D at the project level
is working well and that project budgets are
focused on executing programs from
acquisitions to development and operations.
This allows for the
transition of space …R&D at
technologies developed the project
for strategic purposes to level is
tactical use in the
theater of operations, working well.
like intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,
and communications satellites. An additional
area that is working deals with cooperation
among military, civil, and international space
sectors with regard to meteorological data
sharing.
What are the Obstacles?
One obstacle discussed was the absence of
common goals and objectives across the
different space programs and projects of the
U.S. This is a strategic planning issue that
requires a focal point at a high-level of
decision making, such as a national-level
coordinating body for space in the Office of
the President. Strategic planning can help to
align agencies and missions with a common

purpose, especially in light of constrained
budgets. There is as well the need for realistic
budget estimates followed by political will
and leadership to
One obstacle execute programs.

discussed
was the
absence of
common
goals and
objectives…

A second obstacle
concerned the erosion
of the U.S. space
industrial base as a
result of three key
factors: (1) reduced
R&D investments; (2)
export controls; and (3) worldwide
proliferation of space technologies. One way
to address the erosion is to set national goals
for the industrial base and to implement the
goals through the agencies and departments of
the U.S. Government.
A third key obstacle mentioned is in regard to
gaps between acquisition of space systems,
development of those systems, and operations
of the systems. Within the Department of
Defense (DOD), one group builds things and
one group buys things; there is no common
purpose between the two groups. Each group
has its own agenda and interests. The
dysfunctional acquisition process of the
National
Polarorbiting
Operational
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)
program exemplifies what can go wrong as a
result of these gaps.
At issue as well, is how to leverage
commercial space assets, like the future
placement of SSA sensors on commercial
telecommunications satellites and making
better use of secondary capacity on
government space launches. The use of
commercial space assets to acquire data for
military and security purposes requires a
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change in the way data is viewed from a
product to be controlled to a commodity in the
public domain similar to data on the internet,
or even the GPS signal. The current policy for
the use of secondary launch capacity is for
once a year with the goal among those in the
space community for every launch. One
effective way to realize this is by
congressional mandate.
What Would You Change
Following the discussion on obstacles,
panelists were asked what they would change
if they had to power to do so. One proposed
change
is
to
establish a high- …establish a
level coordinating higher level
body, such as the coordinating
National
Space body…for
Council or a body at national and
the level of the
interagency
National
Security
Council Deputies, coordination of
for national and space policy.
interagency coordination of space policy.
Also, it would be useful to have such top-level
executive guidance – strategic direction – in
the implementation of space activities.
A second proposed change would be to better
balance security with commercial and civil
uses of space to ensure a robust industrial base
– revitalization of the science and technology
base – which is essential for space power. In
other words, focus on national goals for the
industrial base. An essential change to make
possible a robust industrial base is to reform
export controls, namely ITAR.
The last two proposed changes include
rethinking how we share information and
establishing interface standards. With regard
to information sharing, the example was given
to utilize data that already exists among
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satellite operators for advancing SSA data
sharing. And, interface standards, equivalent
to the plug and play approach of USB ports
for computers, for satellite buses and for the
integration of satellite payloads onto space
launch vehicles were viewed as important.
National Space Strategy
Strategy bridges policy goals with capabilities,
and it provides a roadmap for ends and the
ways and means to get there. A key challenge
facing the U.S. is to formulate a national space
strategy and execute that strategy with
leadership, organization, and management.
There is hesitancy among experts to develop
an overarching space strategy as consensus on
such an approach within the fragmented
of
…involvement of environment
organizations and
industry and sectors of the
international different
U.S.
engagement are space programs is
imperatives as daunting. Rather,
part of national elements of a
space
space strategy national
strategy need to be
development. based on what is
common
among
the space sectors. The approach to strategy
should be issue-focused within this context.
Lastly, it was pointed out that the involvement
of industry and international engagement are
imperatives as part of national space strategy
development. The commercial sector can play
a role, if DOD will let them, in meeting
national security space requirements, like
protected telecommunications for example.
Strategy development can also advance
international cooperation in security space,
particularly in the area of SSA data sharing.

12
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New Approaches to Arms Control
Opening Remarks
There is a sparse record of accomplishment in
arms control related to space. One, the Outer
Space Treaty constrained the development of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
activities in space. Two, the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty prohibited space-based
ballistic missile
defense (BMD). …conditions do
Three,
arms not now appear to
control
treaties be in place for
reaffirmed
the ambitious
ABM
Treaty’s undertakings in
valuable normspace diplomacy
setting provisions
protective
of for arms control
satellites
for because of the
intelligence ends. considerable
And four, there mistrust between
was one serious key spacefaring
effort to negotiate
states…
constraints
on
military space capabilities concerning ASAT
weapons between the U.S. and Soviet Union
in the mid-1970s.
There are a number of reasons for the sparse
record of accomplishment in arms control
related to space. The U.S. has preferred nontreaty approaches to arms control related to
space and there are other negotiating
priorities, usually nuclear related. Also, there
exist long periods of disinterest and the United
Nations Conference on Disarmament is
blocked by consensus rule. Furthermore,
conditions do not now appear to be in place
for ambitious undertakings in space diplomacy
for arms control because of: the considerable
mistrust between key spacefaring states; the
underlying conditions are not ready either for
the development of arms control or for any

potential agreements to transform relations
between Russia, China, and the U.S.; the
Obama Administration has higher priority
negotiating objectives on nuclear related
matters; verification and scope are at odds
with one another – the more ambitious the
negotiating agenda, the harder it will be to
verify; and over-reaching is a possible factor,
such as insisting on a treaty over informal
approaches.
During opening remarks, several criteria for
space diplomacy initiatives for the Obama
Administration, which will help to shift
relations between major space powers – and
their behavior in space – for the better were
indentified. These criteria are listed below.
 Agreements must advance U.S. national
security.
 Agreements that work best set norms that
advance responsible behavior in space. In
doing so, norms help isolate irresponsible
behavior in space and, if necessary,
facilitate responses of our choosing to
dangerous and irresponsible behavior. A
code of conduct to extend the no harmful
interference provision found in many
earlier agreements to all satellites that
serve peaceful and military support
functions, and a KE-ASAT ban treaty are
efforts worth pursuing to better ensure
responsible behavior in space.1
 Agreements that have the best chance of
success will focus on immediate problems
that have the potential of growing far
1

Some panelists thought that soft law, such as a code of
conduct or rules of the road can capture the KE-ASAT issue,
and thus the need for a formal treaty to ban ASATs may not
be needed. All panelists agreed that to regulate behavior in
space, capabilities must also be regulated and these
regulations must be result-oriented aimed at building
customary practices.
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worse. The orbital debris problem and the
space traffic management problem qualify.
Agreements must be reached in a timely
manner, and focus on space, not ballistic
missile defense.
Discussion

During the discussion period, a number of
issues were identified and discussed. The first
issue concerned deterrence failure, and the
right mix of strategies and policies to prevent
failure. One reason for failure is that someone
else might attack first if they think the benefits
outweigh the costs. A second reason is
inadvertent due to issues of insecurity and the
security dilemma, and the dynamics of arms
races. And a third reason, lies with an
adherence to the view, among U.S. military
leaders, of a contested space environment,
which can become a “self fulfilling” prophecy.
Prevention of deterrence failure must be
thought of in the context of several factors:
there is no rivalry
today akin to Cold The Outer
War; cooperation Space Treaty…
is
more
an is essential as it
international norm sets the
today than before; agenda for
and there are more
norms to be
pressing problems
than space arms abided by in
control, such as space.
nuclear, missile,
and high-technology proliferation. These
factors suggest that there is a need for a
strategy of reassurance, not dominance or
control, with residual space deterrence to
ensure responsible space behavior based on
freedom of action and no harmful interference
in the space dolman. In this way, the U.S. can
reiterate norms and rules about space and
make clear that it will discuss other
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possibilities, such as a ban on weapons in
space.
The second key issue discussed concerned the
critical role of law with regard to arms control.
Law establishes the context for a stable and
predictable environment. Even more so, law
backed-up by political commitments can get
you what you want. International law is
ambiguous, but ambiguity can be strategic as
law is based in getting agreement on valid
interpretations of principles and interests.
The Outer Space Treaty (OST) is essential as
it sets the agenda for norms to be abided by in
space. It is based on ideas of reciprocity for
freedom of action in space for all, and
negative obligations to avoid harmful
interference. Over the years, the OST has
proven to be valid and enduring, although it
does need clarification. The one weakness of
the OST regime is that it is not optimally
suited to respond to changing political and
technical conditions. Examples of some of
these changes identified in this session
include: dual use technologies; rate of change
in space technology; balance of capabilities
(space is asymmetric); growth in the number
of actors that complicates multilateral efforts
and engagement; blurred intersections
between military, commercial, and civil uses
of space, and thus, the need for greater clarity
between what is considered peaceful military
use of space and what is not, e.g., what
constitutes a space weapon; and different
geopolitics than the Cold War. These factors
make any new agreement directed at space
related arms control – as well as revisions,
updates, or amendments to OST – a very
challenging prospect.
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China’s Role in Space: Cooperation, Competition, and Conflict
The panelists in this session were in
agreement that China pursues cooperation,
competition, and conflict in space. Space
capabilities can be used to forge and improve
relations with some states. These capabilities
are also a means of displaying and projecting
comprehensive national power. Finally, space
capabilities apply to conflict.
Cooperation
In terms of cooperation, China emphasizes in
its two Space White Papers that it is interested
in engaging in cooperative space ventures.
The success of the Double Star program on
heliophysics is repeatedly mentioned in China
as an example of
cooperation.
A To create a
second example is climate for
the Sino - Brazilian Sino-U.S.
CBERS / Ziyuan
satellite program space
that
provides cooperation,
remote sensing of both states will
Earth
resources. need to engage
Data acquired from in confidence
this program is building
made
available
discussions.
through
data
sharing agreements
with African states in particular. China is also
cooperating with a number of states with the
creation of the FengYunCast weather service
uplink.
Chinese pursuit of international cooperation is
not just a matter of joint space missions.
Through the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation
Organization, China has made it clear that it
views space as a diplomatic tool. Through this
Organization, headquartered in Beijing, China

is prepared to use space as one means of
expanding influence and improving relations
with neighboring states.
In the case of space cooperation between the
U.S. and China, there is a presumption among
U.S. leaders that the Chinese place a greater
value on cooperation. This is insulting to the
Chinese. The Chinese desire to be treated as
equals by the U.S., rather than in the way the
U.S. has tended to view space cooperation
with China as a reward for good behavior
internationally. Despite this, there is recent
progress in space cooperation. There are
indications of future space science cooperation
between the U.S. and China. Panelists
suggested as well that the U.S. should discuss
with China measures for safety in spaceflight,
like compatible air locks and compatible
electrical busses for possible future
cooperation with the Chinese on the ISS
program.
In the past, the U.S. was able to achieve space
cooperation with the Soviet Union despite
deep suspicions, a nuclear arms stand-off, and
the Cold War. Yet with the Soviet Union there
was a long history of a number of strategic
and conventional confidence building
measures, such as strategic arms talks and
agreements on not interfering with National
Technical Means of Verification (NTMV).
Today, there is no dynamic of cooperation and
confidence building measures with the
Chinese as there was with Russia during the
Cold War. To create a climate for Sino-U.S.
space cooperation, both states will need to
engage in confidence building discussions.1
1

One panelist mentioned that the Chinese military leadership
was invited by USSTRATCOM Commander, General Kevin
P. Chilton. On 28 October 2009, General Chilton hosted
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Competition
China has made efforts to enter into the area
of commercial launch services and the
international satellite market. The recent
Chinese sale of satellites to Nigeria and
Venezuela are examples of these efforts,
which included satellite manufacture and
launch, and training of local personnel, all at
competitive prices. An additional area that
typifies the competitive nature of China’s
space efforts lies with the indigenous
development of a satellite navigation system,
Compass. This development makes China a
potential competitor for the satellite
navigation and positioning market regionally
and worldwide. China has emphasized the
importance of satellite navigation and
positioning for future business and security
development. China is also playing a greater
role in the effort to develop international
standards for space activities, including orbital
data. Chinese participation in these efforts will
improve their competitiveness, as they help
shape industry standards and best practices.
Chinese competition in space is not simply a
matter of technological capability as there is a
“space race” among the major spacefaring
Asian states. Japan and India have little desire
to be left behind in space, while China
advances its space activities. For all these
Asian space powers –China, Japan, and India
– space capability reflects comprehensive
national power, and it is not surprising that
these space powers want to use satellite
launches, lunar probes, and human spaceflight
missions for advertising their scientific and
engineering prowess as well as the state of

General Xu Caihou, one of two Vice Chairmen of China’s
Central Military Commission, today. General Xu’s visit is a
vital part of U.S. efforts to engage China on shared strategic
issues, develop cooperative capacity and foster institutional
understanding
between
the
two
militaries,
http://www.stratcom.mil (accessed November 2009).
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their economic, technological, and human
resource capabilities.
Conflict
There is the potential of conflict involving
China in space. This potential is supported by
several key developments. One, the overall
policy climate with regard to space and
defense has not changed since the export
controls issues and violations in relation to
commercial space cooperation between the
U.S. and China in the early 1990s. Two, there
exist lexicon and language issues between the
U.S. and China. For example, the concept of
deterrence in China is different than it is in the
U.S. Space deterrence for the Chinese refers to
the idea of signaling an opponent of the likely
actual use of space power and the attendant
consequences in the hopes that this will
persuade an opponent to undertake a costbenefit analysis, affect their psychology, and
compel them to abandon their original aims.
Within this context, there is an emphasis on
space deterrent capability and the need to
demonstrate that capability. This accounts for
the laser blinding and ASAT tests conducted
by China.2

2

China has stated that they reserve the right to continue ASAT
testing. The panel debated the reasons for China’s ASAT test
and the chain of events that led to the test. One view was that
the ASAT test was conducted not per say in response to any
specific U.S. actions and not targeted at any specific
adversary. The test was simply a logical technology
development path since the 1960s and 1970s for the
projection of Chinese space power. The political view is that
test was a result of U.S. actions, primarily the 1999 U.S.
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. The decision
for the test was made at the highest levels of government,
including both the People’s Liberation Army and Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Further, orbital debris experts in China
briefed officials that the risk was minimal. One panelist
further remarked that in hindsight the Chinese see the ASAT
test as a poor political choice given the debris issue and
negative international implications for China, in particular, as
a norm-setter for space.
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A third area of conflict lies with space
surveillance. Surveillance is seen as hostile by
China as there is no shared understanding of
the importance of NTMV as there was with
Russia. Chinese writings also suggest that
space is not necessarily a global commons –
suggesting an interest in extending
sovereignty there – and that space is a possible
contested battlefield, alongside land, sea, air,
and cyberspace.
As with cooperation and competition, conflict,
including deterrence, is not solely aimed at the
U.S. Chinese leaders have concerns about
Japan, especially in light of Japan’s new Basic
Space Law, which allows Japan to use space
for national security purposes. In addition,
China is concerned about the 2008 “Joint
Declaration on Security Cooperation” between
Japan and India.
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Implementing Security Space Policy in the New Administration
The Obama Administration has started out
strong in the area of space policy formulation
and implementation with calls for reestablishing the National Space Council,
although this has not happened yet, and by
undertaking a number of space policy reviews,
including the Augustine Commission on
human spaceflight, National Security Council
(NSC) and Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP) reviews of national space
policy under Presidential Directive, the
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the
DOD Space Posture Review. Further, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and OSTP list space
as a science and …there is a gap
technology priority between…
because it addresses
policy
several priorities,
including: climate, formulation and
employment, and implementation.
economic stimulus.
There are as well recent increases in funding
for SSA, and reviews regarding future
imagery architecture issues and National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) organization
and management.
At the same time, there is a gap between space
policy formulation and implementation. There
are a number of things that can go wrong with
implementation that were discussed in this
session. First, there can be failure to formulate
policy or update it, and also failure to
implement policy. Second, there can be failure
to fund policy due to poor communication,
such as between the executive and
congressional parts of government. Third,
there can be failure in the implementation
process due to poor management and
organization, poor execution, poor top-level
guidance, and poor delegation to agencies and

departments; in other words, there is no
management structure that incentivizes
cooperation and collaboration across the space
sectors. Fourth, there can be failure to reach
consensus on policy, i.e., failure to resolve
disputes and conflicts, and to reconcile
differences among agencies and departments
that will inevitably exist. Lastly, there can be
failure to get public support. This is where
presidential leadership comes into play.
Panelists suggested a number of ways to
address
these
shortcomings
with
implementation. One way is to institute a
workable coordination mechanism for
effective balance of department and agency
equities. The NSC can play a role in this
regard, and it does do this along with the
OSTP in regard to national space policy
formulation. But the NSC and OSTP are flat
organizations, however, and execution of
policy is an issue. Effective execution can take
place with energized attention and oversight at
the level of the U.S. President as well as
guidance on a clear role for departments and
agencies, including budgets and jurisdictions.
Further, it was stated in this session that the
development of a national space strategy can
provide
effective
guidance
on
the
1
implementation of space policy.

1

Panelists mentioned one report on civil space policy of the
National Research Council of the National Academies,
America’s Future in Space: Aligning the Civil Space Program
with National Needs, which called for organization and
processes to implement space policy across all departments
and agencies, essentially a strategy for civil space. Also,
mentioned was a non-affiliated group of space professionals,
“Committee for U.S. Space Leadership,” that called for a
National Space Strategy to implement space policy.
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Concluding Assessments
Opening Remarks
We are at a critical juncture in the evolution of
space – we need an intellectual foundation to
guide policy and actions. Space was a major
instrument and force in shaping the 20th
century and the nation’s strategy – Apollo,
nuclear deterrence, international cooperation,
technology advances, and international
conduct exemplify this. A central question is:
will space be a similar force in 21st century –
will it be determinant of great power status, a
key instrument of national power? Today,
there is the recognition among leaders that
space is not a discretionary activity, but
essential to the well-being of the U.S. and the
world community.
We are facing challenges in space in all
directions – problems in development and
acquisition, gaps in critical on-orbit
capabilities, systemic program and budget
over-reach, workforce and industry base
issues, foreign competition, space as a
contested
domain,
and
increasing
interconnection
and
interdependence across …we need
all space sectors. The an
Obama Administration intellectual
is interested in space foundation
and is taking some to guide
important steps, such as: policy and
a review of the way
ahead for imagery, actions.
including
Future
Imagery
Architecture
and NRO organization and management; the
Augustine panel review of options for
NASA’s human spaceflight programs; DOD
Space Posture review; the OSTP and OMB
FY2011 budget guidance; and the reviews of
National Space Policy and export control

policy. There is reason for optimism and hope,
but also for realism.
One essential ingredient that must be included
is the development of national space strategy
and a governance mechanism to coordinate
decisions and actions at the national level.
National Space Policy is relatively consistent,
but it does not guide and drive decisions and
actions. There is the fundamental need for
strategic “ways and means” to achieve policy
“ends.” The development of space strategy
should consider the full range of tools –
programs, investments, human capital,
infrastructure, regulatory, and incentives and
buying practices – that the U.S. Government
can employ. Also, there is need for
governance structures where agencies can
execute and where the U.S. President can
coordinate decisions and actions, such as
through the NSC Deputies structure.
Ultimately, space is critical to continued U.S.
world leadership. Space is a strategically
important enterprise for the nation – it
contributes to the nation’s instruments of
power and influence in areas of commerce,
security, politics, and international relations in
unique and asymmetric ways – with far more
value than simply the dollars and people
devoted to it. The real question today is: does
the Obama Administration see it so – that
space is an essential enabler of national goals
for climate change, security, international
cooperation, and domestic competitiveness in
education and technology.
Discussion
The concluding session identified that there
needs to be a “center-of-gravity” at the level
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of the United States President with regard to
space. Further, the absence of a true strategy
for space is an issue. A strategy can provide
guidance for how to apply the full range of
tools to achieve ends. What is needed is for a
formulated strategy to be implemented
through effective governance mechanisms and
through persistent leadership. All this is
essential as space is critical – a strategic
enterprise and one with asymmetric
advantages.
Three key elements to implement national
policy and a strategy for space were discussed:
(1) presidential leadership to set and establish
the agenda for space; (2) presidential
persistence to see the agenda through
formulation and implementation; and (3) a
responsive
bureaucracy.
Effective
implementation is essential as U.S. space
programs are at a critical juncture. Space is a
dominant force and tool for national power
and national security, and there exists a
mature industry that plays a fundamental role
in space activities. Success for policy and
strategy development will be determined by
whether space can be linked to national goals
and priorities.
There are number of specific challenges
facing the space community. One challenge is
the need to establish the intellectual
foundations for thinking about space at the
strategic level. Most fundamentally, what is
the strategic concept with regard to space – is
it part and parcel of global commons
management? Should we worry more about
ensuring our access versus denial of others –
is this is a better way to ensure our
asymmetric advantage?1
A second challenge lies with the reality of
constrained budgets. This leads to problems of
1

One panelist remarked that if you have to prioritize,
prioritize our access over denying others’ access.
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over-reach in system development and in
excessive program demands relative to
resources and budgets. For example, NASA
cannot execute current plans for human
spaceflight within current and projected
budgets, and the QDR
…space is effort points to tradecritical to offs on space programs
continued and projects. This all
U.S. world leads to the conclusion
leadership. that program demands,
in an environment of
constrained budgets, can only be met through
partnering with the space commercial sector,
cooperating internationally, and shaping the
governance environment regarding space.2
A third set of challenges discussed concern
acquisitions and industrial base issues,
including export controls. Of concern with
acquisitions, is how to address gaps in new
system development, especially for the
military and intelligence space sectors. Export
controls and cuts in research and development
(R&D) funding erode the U.S. space industrial
base. This erosion is further exacerbated by
the fact that unmanned access to space is
reliant to a large extent on Russian rocket
engines. There are also cross-cutting industrial
base issues; if NASA gives up solid rocket
motors, for example, will the U.S. military
have to pay large fixed cost to maintain a
solids rocket industry?

2

It was discussed in this session that shaping the governance
environment regarding space can mitigate the negative
consequences of challenges posited by foreign competition
and space as a contested domain. In general, shaping the
environment to one more favorable to the U.S. can be
accomplished by asserting U.S. leadership in the area of
collective action for security, commercial, and civil space
activities.
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This article is republished here with permission from the author. See “Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security,”
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The specific question addressed here is: what
progress could be made at a possible Outer
Space Treaty (OST) Revision Conference and
how should a possible Revision Conference
unfold?”1 The answer to the question as
framed is, with serious trepidation and
extreme caution. However, the question
contains the assumption that a revision
conference for the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer
Space Treaty) ought to occur. The response to
that assumption is, at this point in time, to
leave the Outer Space Treaty alone.
Regardless of how compelling or meritorious
the reason for revising the Outer Space Treaty
may appear to be, the fact is there is much
more to lose than there is to gain. This article
begins with an overview of the Outer Space
Treaty, a brief discussion of its provisions and
its likely status during a revision conference.
It then raises the hard questions that must be
addressed in a discussion about potentially
revising the treaty. A conclusion follows.
The Outer Space Treaty is, beyond any
question, one of the most successful
multilateral, international treaties ever
promulgated.2 It has been accepted by a large
1

See “Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space
Security,” Conference Report, 30-31 March 2006, United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.
2
Sergio Marchisio, “The Evolutionary Stages of the Legal
Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the

majority of the world’s nation-states,
including all of the world’s space-capable
states.3 Nearly 40 years after it entered into
force in 1967, the Outer Space Treaty still
continues to garner signatories. As newly
active and recently advancing space nations
continue to emerge, they are also choosing to
become treaty signatories.4 “It is also
generally agreed by legal scholars and
governments that the earlier Declaration of
Legal Principles, which was incorporated into
the Outer Space Treaty, expresses general
customary law, binding on all states.”5
Moreover, treaties that “provide for
neutralization or demilitarization of a territory
or area, such as... outer space” “have been
held to create a status or regime valid erga
omnes (for the entire world).”6
The Outer Space Treaty is quasiconstitutional, which means it functions like a

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS),” Journal of Space
Law 31 (2005): 219–226.
3
As of 1 January 2008, 125 have accepted the Outer Space
Treaty
(98
ratifications
and
27
signatories),
www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/treatystatus/index.html
(accessed November 2009).
4
For example, Nigeria ratified the Outer Space Treaty due to
the successful launch of its first satellite, NigeriaSat 1, on 27
September 2003.
5
Lori F. Damrosch et al., International Law Cases and
Materials (American Casebook Series, Fourth Edition,
Thomson West, 2001). See Rule 15.1 and 15.4.
6
Antony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge
(Cambridge University Press, 2000), 208-209, citing M.
Raggazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga
Omnes, 1997, 24–27.
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constitution for space. “It is a quasi
constitution, not only a culmination, but also
an initiation.”7 The principles it contains are
the foundation of the Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects (Liability Convention), the
Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space (Registration
Convention) and the Agreement on the Rescue
of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (Astronaut Rescue Agreement).
Because the Outer Space Treaty functions like
a constitution, opening it for revision means
that all of its provisions will be vulnerable to
change. These provisions include some of the
most important and fundamental principles in
international space law. They include: that the
exploration and use of space is to be for the
benefit and interests of all countries;8 space is
the “province of all mankind”;9 all states are
free to explore, use and scientifically
investigate space;10 state appropriation of
space is prohibited;11 nuclear weapons and
weapons of mass destruction are prohibited;12
military bases, installations, fortifications,
weapons testing, and military maneuvers are
forbidden on the Moon and other celestial
bodies;13 states are responsible for all space
activities undertaken by national and nongovernmental entities;14 and states can be held
liable for damage caused by their space
objects.15 All of these would be at risk in a
revision conference.

7

George S. Robinson and Harold M. White, Jr., Envoys of
Mankind: a Declaration of First Principles for the
Governance of Space Societies (Washington, DC,
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986), 181.
8
Outer Space Treaty, Article I.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid., Article II.
12
Ibid., Article IV.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid., Article VI.
15
Ibid., Article VII.

It has been argued that revision is a narrow
approach that can be contained and controlled,
and that it is unnecessary to assume revision
can or will lead to an amendment process,
which, according to this view, is a broader
approach that can be avoided. This view fails
to take into account that the Outer Space
Treaty, unlike the Liability Convention and
the Registration Convention, which do
provide for revision,16 provides only for
amendment.17 More importantly, to speak of
“revision”
rather
The Outer than “amendment”
Space Treaty… is increasingly a
functions like a distinction without a
difference
in
constitution for international law.
space. The International
Law Commission,
when considering the question of whether or
not there is a difference between the two, “saw
no essential legal difference in the processes
of amendment and review, regarding
amendment as including review.”18 Without a
clear legal demarcation between “amendment”
and “review,” the true force that will be at
play in an Outer Space Treaty revision
conference is politics. A politically motivated
revision process will guarantee “no
guarantees.” All treaty provisions will be
susceptible to change or elimination.
Interest groups are another force that will be
activated in a treaty revision process. Some
interest groups are seeking to change the
Outer Space Treaty for their own reasons,
including clarifying and establishing property
rights in space.19 If the Outer Space Treaty
16

Liability Convention, Article XXVI; and Registration
Convention, Article X.
17
Outer Space Treaty, Article XV.
18
Antony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge
(Cambridge University Press, 2000), 220.
19
Robert A. Fabian, Space Economic Development in the
Province of All Mankind: If No One Goes, We All Lose,
Astropolitics 1: 1 (2003): 89-98. Here, the Outer Space Treaty
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were opened for any reason, these groups
would welcome the opportunity to introduce
their own purposes into the process and would
bring political pressure to open it up. Another
force that will work to expand a revision
conference is those nation-states in the current
geopolitical environment that advocate
eliminating all of the space treaties and
beginning
anew
with
one,
single,
comprehensive agreement.20
In addition to interest groups and nations that
advocate a new, single space agreement,
another indicator that an Outer Space Treaty
revision process will inevitably expand to the
entire space treaty regime is the treaty
drafters’ intention that the space treaties be
interrelated.21 “The Outer Space Treaty...
provides a framework for a number of limited
accords between individual countries and
intergovernmental organizations as well as
[the] subsequent [space] treaties.”22 The
Astronaut Rescue Agreement is specifically
based on Article V23 of the Outer Space

is characterized as “the current legal obstacle to any effort to
develop space resources like asteroids or solar power.”
20
Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, “Space Law: Its Cold War
Origins and Challenges in the Era of Globalization,” Suffolk
University Law Review 37 (2004): 1041–1053.
21
Walter A. McDougall, …the Heavens and the Earth, a
Political History of the Space Age (Basic Books, 1985), 431.
22
George S. Robinson and Harold M. White, Jr., Envoys of
Mankind: a Declaration of First Principles for the
Governance of Space Societies (Washington, DC,
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986), 181–182. The
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement) also relates
back to the Outer Space Treaty. However, the Moon
Agreement relates back to the Outer Space Treaty as a whole,
without reference to a specific article.
23
Outer Space Treaty, Article V: States’ Parties to the Treaty
shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer space
and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of
accident, distress, or emergency landing on the territory of
another State Party or on the high seas. When astronauts make
such a landing, they shall be safely and promptly returned to
the State of registry of their space vehicle. In carrying on
activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts
of one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the
astronauts of other States’ Parties. States Parties’ to the Treaty
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Treaty, the Liability Convention is based on
Article VII,24 and the Registration Convention
is based on Article VIII.25 Together, these
treaties create an interrelated legal framework
that creates a legal whole that is greater than
the sum of its parts – a rare condition in
international law. Opening the underlying
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty upon
which the latter treaties are based will, of
necessity, bring their status into question as
well.
The type of interrelation that
exists among these treaties is
unusual in international law,
except in the case of the United
Nations Charter and the Statute
of the International Court of
Justice, both of which are
incorporated by reference into
the Outer Space Treaty.26

shall immediately inform the other States’ Parties to the
Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any
phenomena they discover in outer space, including the Moon
and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to
the life or health of astronauts.
24
Outer Space Treaty, Article VII: Each State Party to the
Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object
into outer space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility
an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to
another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical
persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in
air space or in outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies.
25
Outer Space Treaty, Article VIII: A State Party to the Treaty
on whose registry an object launched into outer space is
carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object,
and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a
celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer
space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial
body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their
presence in outer space or on a celestial body or by their
return to the Earth. Such objects or component parts found
beyond the limits of the State Party to the Treaty on whose
registry they are carried shall be returned to that State Party,
which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to
their return.
26
George S. Robinson and Harold M. White, Jr., Envoys of
Mankind: a Declaration of First Principles for the
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A critical aspect of the Outer Space Treaty
that must to be raised in any discussion about
its potential revision is the treaty’s status in
international law in the event of the outbreak
of hostilities or armed conflict.27 Today the
status of the Outer Space Treaty during
hostilities is crystal clear: it remains in force
and its provisions are available during
conflict. However, if hostilities were to begin
while a review process was in progress, the
treaty’s status would be unclear.
The Outer Space Treaty is a law-making
treaty28 and is, therefore, a member of a very
special category of treaties that remain in
force and which do not terminate with the
outbreak of hostilities.29 It is a treaty “among a
multitude of states that establish[es] a rule or
system of rules that govern the conduct of
states in a particular area of international
law.”30 Moreover, it is “one of the outstanding
lawmaking
treaties
of
contemporary

Governance of Space Societies (Washington, DC,
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1986), 182.
27
Much of the research for this particular topic was done by
LaToya Tate, a third year law student at the University of
Mississippi School of Law and a researcher at the National
Remote Sensing and Space Law Center. The subject is
examined in depth in her paper, see LaToya Tate, “The Status
of the Outer Space Treaty at International Law During “War”
and “Those Measures Short of War,” Journal of Space Law
32 (2006).
28
Sergio Marchisio, “The Evolutionary Stages of the Legal
Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS),” Journal of Space
Law 31 (2005): 226.
29
Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1961), 723. See also L. Oppenheim and H. Lauterpacht,
International Law a Treatise (Seventh Edition, London,
Longmans, Green and Company, 1952, 304; J. Delbruck,
“War, Effect on Treaties,” in: R. Bernhardt, ed., Encyclopedia
of Public International Law (Max Planck Institute for
Comparative Public Law and International Law, 1982), 310312; U.S. Supreme Court, Society for the Propagation of the
Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New Haven, 21 U.S. 464, 8 Wheat.
464 (1823), Washington, DC.
30
Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1961), 723.

international law as a whole.”31 Nor will the
Outer Space Treaty suspend during conflict.
The twentieth century trend – which is
continuing into the twenty-first century – is
the growing presumption that treaties do not
suspend with the commencement of
hostilities. “The outbreak of armed conflict
does not ipso facto terminate or suspend the
operations of treaties in force.”32
Furthermore, in the case of the Outer Space
Treaty,
practice
is
consistent
with
jurisprudence. The Outer Space Treaty
remained in force during both the 1991 Gulf
War and the 2003 Gulf War. The former is
widely recognized as the “first space war” and
the latter as the “second space war” having
used various space-based assets for the first
and second time in a conflict. However, if
hostilities were to begin while a review
process was in progress, the treaty’s lawmaking status and the availability of its
provisions specifically relevant to hostilities,
including limiting military activity to
scientific and peaceful purposes, the ban on
nuclear weapons and weapons of mass
destruction, and the right to remain free from
interference while using space would be
unclear.
The non-interference principle in international
space law and the neutrality principle in the
law of war are, in essence, the same. Both of
the principles are concerned with protecting
peaceful activities in an area or region used by
non-belligerents. In the Outer Space Treaty,
states are afforded non-discriminatory access
to, and non-interference with, their use of
31

Sergio Marchisio, “The Evolutionary Stages of the Legal
Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS),” Journal of Space
Law 31 (2005): 226.
32
Institut de Droit International, The Effects of Armed
Conflicts on Treaties, Articles 2 and 5, 28 August 1985,
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/navig_chon1983.html
(accessed
November 2009).
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space.33 Under the neutrality principle, states
that are not part of a conflict can assert their
right to remain neutral and not to be interfered
with by the belligerents.34 If hostilities were to
start during a review process the treaty’s
guarantee against non-interference with the
use of space would be placed in doubt.

spacefarer, and developing nation and nonspacefarer.35 Nuclear and space activities are
being rearranged. In light of the changes in the
terrestrial nuclear regime, it is not at all clear
that the Outer Space Treaty’s nuclear weapons
ban in space would survive a revision
conference.

This article also addresses the question of how
to best leverage the Outer Space Treaty to
enhance space security. The response to that
question is to not just focus on what the treaty
does not provide, but also to appreciate how
much it does provide. A discussion on how to
best leverage the Outer Space Treaty to
enhance space security must include asking
hard questions. They begin with: would the
provisions that the Outer Space Treaty
contains be achievable today?

Would there be agreement today on limiting
military activity in space to peaceful or
scientific purposes? The nature and role of
military entities since the end of the Cold War
have been undergoing questioning and
changes all around the world. Recognizing
and defining what constitutes “peaceful” or
“scientific” activities will continue to test the
limits of the Outer Space Treaty, but it will
not expand the categories of permitted
military actions. Revising the treaty can.

Specifically, would there be agreement on
banning nuclear weapons and weapons of
mass destruction? Current events include
rapidly developing situations in the constantly
shifting geopolitical
landscape
that The Outer
provide
evidence Space
that the nuclear
Treaty…
regime is under
stress.
Developed remains in
and
developing force… with
nations
are the outbreak
realigning regarding of hostilities.
what are considered
permissible nuclear
activities. Ostensibly controlled nuclear access
is now emerging in tandem with nonproliferation. The long-standing dichotomy
between nuclear capable and developed
nations and the non-nuclear capable and
developing nations is shifting, as is the
dichotomy between developed nation and

Is there a clear, present, and credible threat
that justifies the disruption that will inevitably
occur by attempting to revise the Outer Space
Treaty? In the 1960s, the nations of the world
were brought to the negotiating table because
both the former Soviet Union and the United
States had successfully and pragmatically
proven that they had existing and substantial
launch and weapons capabilities. Existing
rockets could have been either transportation
vehicles for scientific experiments or for
weapons. Does the current geopolitical
landscape provide an analogous situation
today? Are there any nations that now have
both an independent, robust, long-term launch
capability, and proven advanced space
weaponry that create a situation dire enough to

33

Outer Space Treaty, Articles I, IX, and XII.
Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict
(Manchester University Press, 1993), 259.

34

35

Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, Comments on the Discussion
Paper, Space Law and Remote Sensing Activities, Workshop
on Space Law Disseminating and Developing International
and National Space Law: The Latin America and Caribbean
Perspective, United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs,
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 22-25 November 2004,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/workshops/index.h
tml (accessed November 2009).
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risk the stability that the Outer Space Treaty
provides?
Assuming, only for the sake of argument, that
there is an existing space threat analogous to
the former Soviet Union-United States Cold
War capabilities: will it last as long as the time
required to negotiate revised or amended
treaty terms? The United Nations was first
asked to consider the legal issues associated
with space activities in 1958.36 The Outer
Space Treaty entered into force in 1967.37
Even with the extreme pressures of the Cold
War, it took nearly a decade to complete and
activate the Outer Space Treaty. Nine years is
definitely fast in terms of international treaty
negotiations, however, the more significant
fact is that at that time, space technology
development was still in its early stages and
less likely to outpace the speed of
negotiations. Today, the intense, focused,
urgent pressures of the Cold War have given
way to a diverse, multipolar array of forces,
and space technology has advanced. And
today, the likelihood is that discussions would
be less focused and more wide ranging; once
opened, attempted revisions could lead to
decades of debate and negotiations. At the
same time, the ability to implement already
developing technologies could outpace
negotiations.
Also to be considered is that the original
perceived threat that catalyzes a revision
conference could be readily overcome by
more dynamic economic and political events,
including cyclical elections, changes of
administration, changing foreign policies, and
national fiscal and budgetary constraints.
Moreover, the original threat could be

supplanted by a new, unforeseen one that
might not have been activated but for the
opportunity presented by the ongoing
negotiations and the uncertain status of the
treaty during that time. This leads to the next
hard question.
What behavior, practice, or custom will
develop to fill the legal ambiguity created
during the revision process? Once revision
begins and various political forces enter the
process, the status of the Outer Space Treaty
and specific provisions will be unclear for the
duration of the process. Ambiguity regarding
signatories’ obligations will increase and some
will be emboldened to take action to resolve
the increased ambiguity in their favor. This is
exactly what happened at the dawn of the
space age. The legality of satellite overflight
was not established at the time that the former
Soviet Union and the United States embarked
on their race to space.38 With the successful
launch of Sputnik 1 and lack of objection by
the United States, the precedent for satellite
overflight without seeking sovereign consent
was quickly set in a matter of days.39 A
variation on the theme of the role of ambiguity
during a revision process is that there will be
some nations that will have no incentive to
resolve new ambiguities that, in their view,
replace settled, but inconvenient treaty
obligations.
Finally, no treaty revision occurs in a legal
vacuum. It must occur within the framework
of the entire prevailing legal system, related
agreements, and general principles of law.
This presents an infinite number of paths that
a treaty revision conference can be made to
take, increasing the likelihood of delay and
uncertainty to an unquantifiable degree.
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Walter A. McDougall, …the Heavens and the Earth, a
Political History of the Space Age (Basic Books, 1985), 184.
37
The Outer Space Treaty opened for signature on 27 January
1967 and entered into force on 10 October 1967. See United
Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, United Nations
Treaties and Principles on Space Law.
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Walter A. McDougall, …the Heavens and the Earth, a
Political History of the Space Age (Basic Books, 1985), 119–
120.
39
Ibid., 134, 187.
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Unquantifiable uncertainty ought to be risked
only for the most menacing and most
immediate of threats.
Taking a long look backward at the history of
humanity, it becomes quickly evident that it is
folly to say that anything should never change,
even the Outer Space Treaty. However, for the
foreseeable future, the Outer Space Treaty
should be left alone. Opening it for revision
now is a case of “be careful what you wish
for.”
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Space law has and should continue to play an
essential role in the evolution of spacepower.
Testing the principle of “freedom of space”
and helping establish the legality of satellite
overflight were primary objectives of NSC5520, the first U.S. space policy, approved by
President Eisenhower in May 1955;1 during
the 1960s, the superpowers and other
emerging spacefaring states negotiated a farreaching and forward-thinking Outer Space
Treaty (OST);2 and today a variety of
transparencyand
confidence-building
measures (TCBMs) for space are being
discussed and debated in a number of fora.3
1

The best and most comprehensive analysis of the complex
maneuvering by the superpowers at the opening of the space
age remains Walter A. McDougall’s …the Heavens and the
Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (Basic Books,
1985). NSC-5520 is reprinted in John M. Logsdon, ed.
Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of
the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume I, Organizing for
Exploration (Washington, D.C.: NASA History Office, 1995),
308-313. McDougall in Heavens and Earth and R. Cargill
Hall’s introductory essay, “Origins of U.S. Space Policy:
Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of Space,” in
Exploring the Unknown, Volume I masterfully develop the
context and purposes of NSC-5520. Hall uses the term
“stalking horse” to describe the purpose of the IGY satellite in
relation to the WS-117L (America’s first reconnaissance
satellite program). “Peaceful purposes” for space activity are
often referenced and cited, but never authoritatively defined.
2
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies (General Assembly resolution 2222
(XXI), annex ), adopted 19 December 1966, opened for
signature on 27 January 1967, and entered into force on 10
October 1967.
3
The term “transparency” apparently connotes espionage
when translated into Chinese, and since the Chinese are a key
party that spacefaring actors wish to engage, consideration

Law can be perhaps the single most important
means
of
providing
structure
and
predictability to humanity’s interactions with
the cosmos. Justice, reason, and law are
nowhere more needed than in the boundless,
anarchic, and self-help environment of the
final frontier. The topics space law is designed
to address, the precedents from which it is
drawn, and the pathways ahead it illuminates
will be critical determinants of the future
development of spacepower.
Although there is some substance to
arguments that the OST only precludes those
military activities that were of little interest to
the superpowers and does not bring much
clarity or direction to many of the most
important potential space activities, the treaty,
nonetheless,
provides
a
solid
and
comprehensive foundation upon which to
build additional legal structures needed to
advance spacepower. Spacefaring actors can
most effectively improve on this foundation
through a number of actions, including further
developing and refining the OST regime,
adapting the most useful parts of analogous
regimes such as the Law of the Sea and
Seabed Authority mechanisms, and rejecting
standards that stifle innovation, inadequately
address threats to humanity’s survival, or do
not provide opportunities for rewards
commensurate with risks undertaken. In the

should be given to finding an alternative term, perhaps
“clarity-of-intensions.”
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three sections below, this article explores
other specific ways improvements in space
law may contribute to: furthering the quest for
sustainable space security; enabling more
direct creation of wealth in and from space;
and ultimately improving the odds for
humanity’s survival by helping to protect the
Earth and space environments. Without
clearer and better developed space law,
humanity may squander opportunities and
investments, making it more difficult for
spacepower to enable these and other critical
contributions to our future.
While desires for better refined space law to
advance spacepower may be clear, progress
towards developing and implementing
improvements is not likely to be fast or easy.
Terrestrial law evolved
Space law
fairly steadily and has
operated over millennia. has and
Space law, by contrast, should
is a relatively novel continue to
concept that rapidly play an
emerged within a few essential
years of the opening of
role in the
the space age and
thereafter
greatly evolution of
slowed. The objectives spacepower.
of space law must
include not just aspirational goals, such as
structuring competition between humans and
helping define and refine fundamental
interactions between humanity and the
cosmos, but also more mundane issues, like
property rights and commercial interests. It is
likely there will be growing pressure for space
law to provide greater predictability and
structure in many areas despite the fact that it
can be very difficult to establish foundational
legal elements for the cosmic realm, such as
evidence,
causality,
attribution,
and
precedence. Moreover, any movement
towards improving space law is likely to be
slowed by discouraging attributes associated
with spacepower that include very long

timelines and prospects for only potential or
intangible benefits. These factors can erode
acceptance of and support for improving space
law at both the personal and political levels,
but also point to the need for an incremental
approach and reinforce the long-term value of
law in providing stability and predictability.
Other impediments to further developing
space law are exacerbated by a lack of
acceptance in some quarters that sustained,
cooperative efforts are often the best and
sometimes the only way in which humanity
can address our most pressing survival
challenges. Cosmic threats to humanity’s
survival exist and include the depletion of
resources and fouling of our only current
habitat, threats in the space environment, such
as large objects that could strike Earth causing
cataclysmic damage, and the eventual
exhaustion and destruction of the Sun. The
message is clear: environmental degradation
and space phenomena can threaten our
existence, but humanity can improve our odds
for survival if we can cooperate in grasping
and exploiting survival opportunities. Law can
provide one of the most effective ways to
structure and use these opportunities.
Sustained dialogue can help raise awareness,
generate support for better space law, and
ultimately nurture the spacepower needed to
improve our odds for survival.
The Quest for Sustainable Security
In examining space law, spacepower, and
humanity’s quest for sustainable security, it is
prudent for spacefaring actors to transcend
traditional categories and approaches by
considering resources in novel, broad, and
multidimensional ways. This article attempts
to employ the spirit of this unrestrained
approach, but is not suggesting that everything
discussed would necessarily turn out to be
useful or implementable in the real world. In
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addition, it is often not practical or even
possible to examine space law developments
in discrete ways by delineating between legal,
technical, and policy considerations, or
between terrestrial and space security
concerns. Over the long run, however, an
expansive approach will undoubtedly reveal
and help create the most opportunities to
advance space law and spacepower in the
most
significant
and
lasting
ways.
Nonetheless, when beginning the journey,
small, incremental steps are the most
pragmatic way to develop and implement
more effective space law, and the process
should first focus on improving and refining
the foundation provided by the OST regime.
Most spacefaring actors understand the merits
and overall value of the OST regime; they are
much more interested in building upon this
foundation than in creating a new structure.
As the most important first steps towards
further developing space law, the international
community needs to find better ways to
achieve more universal adherence to the
regime’s foundational norms and embed all
important spacefaring actors more completely
within the regime.
Beginning work to Most
include major non- spacefaring
state actors in more actors
explicit ways could understand the
prove to be a difficult merits and
undertaking
that
would
require overall value of
substantial expansion the OST
of the regime and regime; they
probably should be are much more
approached on an interested in
incremental
basis. building upon
Fortunately,
the
security dimensions this
of the regime have foundation...
opened widows of
opportunity and important precedents have
been set by expanding participation in the
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United Nations Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) and
World Radio Communication Conferences of
the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU) to include non-state actors as observers
or associate members.
…the United Some form of a twoparticipation
States could tiered
help better structure within the
define OST OST regime might be
appropriate as it may
obligations prove impractical to
and include non- state
demonstrate actors in a formal
leadership in treaty; steps towards
fostering expanded participation
cooperative should begin now,
both to capture the
spacepower… growing spacepower
of non-state actors and to harness their energy
in helping achieve more universal adherence
to the OST regime. Perhaps most importantly,
these initial steps should help promote a sense
of stewardship for space among more actors
and increase attention on those parties that fail
to join or comply with these norms. Of course,
these first steps alone would be insufficient to
make large improvements or assure
compliance with the regime, yet they might be
among the most easily undertaken and
significant ways to advance space law in the
near term. Other specific areas within the OST
regime that should be better developed,
perhaps through creation of a standing body
with implementation responsibilities, include
the Article VI obligations for signatories to
authorize and exercise continuing supervision
over space activities and the Article IX
responsibilities for signatories to undertake or
request appropriate international consultations
before proceeding with any activity or
experiment that would cause potentially
harmful interference.
One key way the United States (U.S.) could
help better define OST obligations and
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demonstrate
leadership
in
fostering
cooperative spacepower would be to share
space situational awareness (SSA) data
globally in more effective ways through the
Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE)
program or some other approach. Congress
has extended the CFE Pilot Program through
September 2010, and following the February
2009 collision between Iridium and Cosmos
satellites, there is more worldwide attention
focused on space debris and spaceflight safety
as well as considerable motivation for the U.S.
to improve the CFE program by providing
SSA data to more users in more timely and
consistent ways.
A most useful specific goal for the CFE
Program would be development of a U.S.
Government operated data center for
ephemeris, propagation data, and premaneuver notifications for all active satellites;
consideration should also be given to the
utility and modalities of creating or
transitioning such a data center to
international
auspices.4
Users
would
voluntarily contribute data to the center,
perhaps through a Global Positioning System
(GPS) transponder on each satellite, and the
data would be constantly updated, freely
available, and readily accessible so that it
could be used by satellite operators to plan for
and avoid conjunctions.5 Difficult legal,
4

For an outstanding and detailed analysis of the benefits and
challenges associated with creation of an international data
center, see Colonel Lee-Volker Cox, “Avoiding Collisions in
Space: Is it Time for an International Space Integration
Center?” U.S. Army War College, 30 March 2007.
5
SSA issues are framed by specialized concepts and jargon.
Conjunctions are close approaches, or potential collisions,
between objects in orbit. Propagators are complex modeling
tools used to predict the future location of orbital objects.
Satellite operators currently use a number of different
propagators and have different standards for evaluating and
potentially
maneuvering
away
from
conjunctions.
Maneuvering requires fuel and shortens the operational life of
satellites. Orbital paths are described by a set of variables
known as ephemeris data; two-line element sets (TLEs) are
the most commonly used ephemeris data. Much of this data is

technical, and policy issues that inhibit
progress on sharing SSA data, include:
bureaucratic inertia, and liability and
proprietary concerns; non-uniform data
formatting standards and incompatibility
between propagators and other cataloguing
tools; and security concerns over exclusion of
certain satellites from any public domain data.
Some of these legal concerns could be
addressed by working towards better cradleto-grave tracking of all catalogued objects to
help establish the launching state and liability;
using opaque processes to exclude proprietary
information from public databases to the
maximum extent feasible; and indemnifying
program operators, even if they provide faulty
data that results in a collision, so long as they
operate in good faith, exercise reasonable
care, and follow established procedures.
History suggests there is a very important role
for militaries both in setting the stage for the
emergence of international legal regimes and
in enforcing the norms of those regimes once
they emerge. Development of TCBMs for
space, such as rules of the road or codes of
conduct, should draw closely from the
development and operation of such measures
in other domains, like sea or air. The
international community should consider the
most appropriate means of separating military

contained in the form of a satellite catalog. The United States
maintains a public catalog at www.space-track.org. Other
entities maintain their own catalogs. Orbital paths constantly
change, or are perturbed, by a number a factors including
Earth’s inconsistent gravity gradient, solar activity, and the
gravitational pull of other orbital objects. Perturbations cause
propagation of orbital paths to become increasingly inaccurate
over time; beyond approximately four days into the future
predictions about the location of orbital objects can be
significantly inaccurate. For more about SSA concepts, see
Brain Weeden, “The Numbers Game,” The Space Review, 13
July 2009. For discussion about ways to share SSA data and
other space security ideas fostered by meetings between the
Department of Defense Executive Agent for Space and the
Chief Executive Officers of commercial satellite operators,
see David McGlade, “Commentary: Preserving the Orbital
Environment,” Space News, 19 February 2007.
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activities from civil and commercial activities
in the building of these measures because
advocating a single standard for how all space
activities ought to be regulated is ambitious
and not likely to be helpful. The U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD) requires safe
and responsible operations by warships and
military aircraft, but
they are not legally History
required to follow all suggests there
the same rules as
commercial
traffic is a very
and
sometimes important role
operate
within for militaries
specially
protected both in setting
zones that separate the stage for
them from
other the emergence
traffic. Full and open
of international
dialogue about these
ideas along with legal regimes
others
will
help and in
develop space rules enforcing the
that draw from years norms of those
of
experience
in regimes once
operating in these
they emerge.
other domains and
make the most sense
for the unique operational characteristics of
space. Other concerns surround the
implications of various organizational
structures and rules of engagement for
potential military operations in space. Should
such forces operate under national or only
international authority, who should decide
when certain activities constitute a threat, and
how should such forces be authorized to
engage threats, especially if such engagements
might create other threats, or potentially cause
harm to humans or space systems? Clearly,
these and a number of other questions are very
difficult to address and require careful
international vetting well before actual
operation of such forces in space. Finally,
consider the historic role of the British Royal
and U.S. Navies in fighting piracy, promoting
free trade, and enforcing global norms against
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slave trading. Should there be analogous roles
in space for the U.S. military and other
military forces today and in the future? What
would be the space component of the
Proliferation Security Initiative and how might
the United States and others encourage likeminded actors to cooperate on such an
initiative? Attempts to create legal regimes or
enforcement norms that do not specifically
include and build upon military capabilities
are likely to be divorced from pragmatic
realities, and ultimately frustrate efforts.6
Seemingly new United States focus and
direction on space TCBMs initially was
provided by a statement on the Obama
Administration White House website that
appeared on 20 January 2009: “Ensure
Freedom of Space: The Obama-Biden
Administration will restore American
leadership on space issues, seeking a
worldwide ban on weapons that interfere with
military and commercial satellites.”7 The
language about seeking a worldwide ban on
space weapons was similar to position papers
issued during the Obama-Biden campaign but
much less detailed and nuanced; it drew
considerable attention and some criticism.8 By
May 2009, the space part of the Defense
Issues section on the White House website had
been changed to read: “Space: The full
spectrum of U.S. military capabilities depends
on our space systems. To maintain our
technological edge and protect assets in this
domain, we will continue to invest in nextgeneration capabilities, such as operationally
responsive space and global positioning
systems. We will cooperate with our allies and
6

On the role of militaries in enforcing legal norms and
analogies between the law of the sea and space law, see R.
Joseph DeSutter, “Space Control, Diplomacy, and Strategic
Integration,” Space and Defense 1: 1 (2006): 29-51.
7
The statement appeared on the Defense Agenda section of
the White House website.
8
See, in particular, the Space News editorial for 2 February
2009, “Banning Space Weapons—and Reality.”
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the private sector to identify and protect
against intentional and unintentional threats to
U.S. and allied space capabilities.” Ongoing
space
policy
reviews,
including
a
congressionally-directed
Space
Posture
Review and Presidential Study Directives on
National Space Policy are likely to encourage
policies that are more supportive of pursuing
TCBMs as well as greater reliance on
commercial and international partners.9
Consideration is also being given to the best
ways to reconcile any new approaches with
the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy language
about opposing “development of new legal
regimes or other restrictions that seek to
prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of
space,” while encouraging “international
cooperation with foreign nations and/or
consortia on space activities that are of mutual
benefit.”10 Spacepower actors can expect to
continue making progress in developing
effective, sustainable, and cooperative
approaches to space security by building on
the ongoing thoughtful dialogue between all
major space actors in several venues that
emphasize a number of primarily incremental,
pragmatic, technical, and bottom-up steps.
Prime examples of this approach, include the
February 2008 adoption by the United Nations
General Assembly of the Inter-Agency Debris
Coordination Committee (IADC) voluntary
guidelines for mitigating space debris and the
December 2008 release from the Council of

9

Section 913 of the Fiscal Year 2009 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 110-417) directs the Secretary of
Defense and Director of National Intelligence to submit a
Space Posture Review to Congress by 1 December 2009. In
addition, the Obama Administration has ongoing Presidential
Study Directives that are examining the need for changes to
current National Space Policy. See Amy Klamper, “White
House Orders Sweeping U.S. Space Policy Review,” Space
News, 15 July 2009.
10
The unclassified version of current National Space Policy
was posted on the Office of Science and Technology Policy
website on 14 October 2006.

the European Union (EU) of a draft Code of
Conduct for outer space activities.11
Beyond the OST, efforts to craft
comprehensive, formal, top-down space arms
control or regulation continue to face the same
significant problems that have overwhelmed
attempts to develop such mechanisms in the
past. The most serious of these problems,
include: disagreements over the proper forum,
scope, and object for negotiations; basic
definitional issues about what is a “space
weapon” and how they might be categorized
as offensive or defensive, and stabilizing or
destabilizing; and daunting concerns about
whether adequate monitoring and verification
mechanisms can be found for any
comprehensive and formalized TCBMs. These
problems relate to a number of very thorny,
specific issues, such as whether the
negotiations should be primarily among only
major spacefaring actors or more multilateral,
what satellites and other terrestrial systems
should be covered, and whether the object
should be control of space weapons or
TCBMs for space; the types of TCBMs which
might be most useful (e.g., rules of the road or
keep-out zones) and how these approaches
might be reconciled with the existing space
law regime; and verification problems, such as
how to address the latent or residual antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities possessed by
many dual-use and military systems, or how to
deal with the significant military potential of
even a small number of covert ASAT systems.
New space system technologies, continuing
growth of the commercial space sector, and
new verification and monitoring methods
interact with these existing problems in
11

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/217,
“International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer
space,” 1 February 2008, and Council of the European Union,
“Council conclusions and draft Code of Conduct for Outer
Space Activity, (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 3
December 2008).
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complex ways. Some of the changes would
seem to favor TCBMs, such as better radars
and optical systems for improved SSA,
attribution, and verification capabilities;
technologies for better space system
diagnostics; and the stabilizing potential of
redundant and distributed space architectures
that create many nodes by employing larger
numbers of smaller and less expensive
satellites. Many other trends, however, would
seem to make space arms control and
regulation even more difficult. For example:
micro- or nano- satellites might be used as
virtually undetectable active ASATs or
passive space mines; proliferation of space
technology has radically increased the number
of significant space actors to include a number
of non-state actors that have developed or are
developing advanced dual-use technologies,
such as autonomous rendezvous and docking
capabilities; satellite-enabled communications
technology can easily be used to jam rather
than communicate; and growth in the
commercial space sector raises issues, such as
how quasi-military systems could be protected
or negated, and the unclear security
implications of global markets for dual-use
space capabilities and products.

There is disagreement about the relative utility
of top-down versus bottom-up approaches to
developing space TCBMs and formal arms
control, but, following creation of the OST
regime, the United States and many other
major spacefaring actors have tended to favor
bottom-up approaches, a point strongly
emphasized by U.S. Ambassador Donald
Mahley in February 2008:

Since the 1970s, five consecutive
U.S.
administrations
have
concluded it is impossible to
achieve an effectively verifiable
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and militarily meaningful space
arms control agreement.12
Yet this assessment may be somewhat
myopic, since strategists need to consider not
only the well-known difficulties with topdown approaches, but also the potential
opportunity costs of inaction, and recognize
when they may need to trade some loss of
sovereignty and flexibility for stability and
restraints on others. Since the United States
has not tested a kinetic energy ASAT since
September 1985 and has no program to
develop such capabilities, would it have been
better to foreclose this option to pursue a
global ban on testing kinetic energy ASATs,
and would such an effort have produced a
restraining effect on Chinese development and
testing of ASAT capabilities? This may have
been a lost opportunity to pursue legal
approaches,
but
is
a
complex,
multidimensional, and interdependent issue
shaped by a variety of other factors, like
inabilities to distinguish between ballistic
missile defense and ASAT technologies,
reluctance to limit technical options after the
end of the Cold War, emergence of new and
less easily deterred threats, and the demise of
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
Moreover, the Chinese, in particular,
apparently disagree with pursuing only
bottom-up approaches, and, in ways that seem
both shrewd and hypocritical, are currently
developing
significant
counterspace
capabilities, while simultaneously advancing
various top-down proposals in support of
prevention of an arms race in outer space
(PAROS) initiatives and moving ahead with
the joint Chinese-Russian draft treaty on
“Prevention of Placement of Weapons in
12
Ambassador Donald A. Mahley, “Remarks on the State of
Space Security,” The State of Space Security Workshop,
Space Policy Institute, George Washington University,
Washington, 1 February 2008.
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Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force
against Outer Space Objects” (PPWT)
introduced at the United Nations Conference
on Disarmament in February 2008. If the
Chinese are attempting to pursue a two-track
approach to space arms control, they need to
present that argument to the international
community much more explicitly. The current
draft PPWT goes to considerable lengths in
attempting to define space, space objects,
weapons in space, placement in space, and the
use or threat of force, but there are still very
considerable definitional issues with respect to
how specific capabilities would be classified.
An even more significant problem relates to
all the terrestrial capabilities that are able to
eliminate, damage, or disrupt the normal
function of objects in outer space, such as the
Chinese direct ascent ASAT. One must
question the utility of a proposed agreement
that does not address the significant security
implications of current space system support
for network-enabled terrestrial warfare, does
not deal with dual-use space capabilities,
seems to be focused on a class of weapons that
does not exist, or at least is not deployed in
space, is silent about all the terrestrial
capabilities that are able to produce weapons
effects in space, and would not even ban
development and testing of space weapons,
only their use.13 Given these weaknesses in the
13

For an outstanding analysis of trigger events for space
weaponization and why space-basing is not necessarily the
most important consideration, see Barry D. Watts, The
Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, February 2001), 97-106. Watts argues that:
“There are at least two paths by which orbital space might
become a battleground for human conflict. One consists of
dramatic, hard-to-miss trigger events, such as the use of
nuclear weapons to attack orbital assets. The other class
involves more gradual changes, such as a series of small,
seemingly innocuous steps over a period of years that would,
only in hindsight, be recognized as having crossed the
boundary from force enhancement to force application.”
Watts discusses high-altitude nuclear detonations, failure of
nuclear deterrence, and threats to use nuclear ballistic missiles
during a crisis as the most likely of the dramatic trigger
events.

PPWT, it seems plausible that it is designed as
much to place political pressure on the United
States and derail U.S. missile defense efforts
as it is to promote sustainable space security.
Since Sino-American relations and space
relations, in particular, are likely to play a
dominant role in shaping the quest for
spacepower and sustainable security during
this century, other proposed Sino-American
cooperative space ventures or TCBMs are
worthy
of
further
Sino- consideration, including
American inviting a Chinese
relations… astronaut to fly on one
of the remaining Space
are likely to Shuttle missions, and
play a making very specific,
dominant role repeated, and public
in shaping the invitations for the
quest for Chinese to join the ISS
spacepower program and other
major cooperative space
and efforts. The United
sustainable States and China could
security also work towards
non
during this developing
century… offensive defenses of
the type advocated by
14
Philip Baines. Kevin Pollpeter explains how
China and the United States could cooperate
in promoting the safety of human spaceflight
and “coordinate space science missions to
derive scientific benefits and to share costs.
Coordinating space science missions with
separately developed, but complementary
space assets, removes the chance of sensitive
technology transfer and allows the two
countries to combine their resources to
achieve the same effects as jointly developed
14

See Philip J. Baines, “The Prospects for ‘Non-Offensive’
Defenses in Space,” in James Clay Moltz, ed., New
Challenges in Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and
Space Security (Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation
Studies, Occasional Paper 12, Monterey Institute of
International Studies, July 2003), 31-48.
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missions.”15 Michael Pillsbury outlined six
other areas where U.S. experts could
profitably exchange views with Chinese
specialists in a dialogue about space weapon
issues: “reducing Chinese misperceptions of
U.S. Space Policy, increasing Chinese
transparency on space weapons, probing
Chinese interest in verifiable agreements,
multilateral versus bilateral approaches,
economic consequences of use of space
weapons, and reconsideration of U.S. hightechnology exports to China.”16
Finally, Bruce MacDonald’s report on China,
Space Weapons, and U.S. Security for the
Council on Foreign
Spacefaring
Relations offers a
number of specific actors should
recommendations for consider
both the United States revising and
and China. For the further
U.S.,
MacDonald developing the
recommends
the
OST regime
following measures:
assessing the impact as a key first
of different U.S. and step when
Chinese
offensive seeking better
space postures and ways to
policies
through harvest
intensified analysis
energy and
and “crisis games,” in
addition to wargames; create wealth
evaluating
the in and from
desirability of a “no space.
first use” pledge for
offensive counter-space weapons that have
irreversible
effects;
pursuing
selected
offensive capabilities meeting important
15

Kevin Pollpeter, “Building for the Future: China's Progress
in Space Technology during the Tenth 5-Year Plan and the
U.S. Response,” (Strategic Studies Institute: U.S. Army War
College, 21 March 2008), 48-50.
16
Michael P. Pillsbury, “An Assessment of China’s AntiSatellite and Space Warfare Programs, Policies, and
Doctrines,” Report prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, 19 January 2007, 48.
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criteria – including effectiveness, reversible
effects, and survivability – in a deterrence
context to be able to negate adversary space
capabilities on a temporary and reversible
basis; refraining from further direct ascent
ASAT tests and demonstrations as long as
China does, unless there is a substantial risk to
human health and safety from uncontrolled
space object re-entry; and entering
negotiations on a kinetic energy ASAT testing
ban. MacDonald’s recommendations for
China include: providing more transparency
into its military space programs; refraining
from further direct ascent ASAT tests as long
as the United States does; establishing a senior
national
security
coordinating
body,
equivalent to a Chinese National Security
Council; strengthening its leadership’s foreign
policy understanding by increasing the
international affairs training of senior officer
candidates and establishing an international
security affairs office within the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA); providing a clear and
credible policy and doctrinal context for the
2007 ASAT test and counterspace programs,
more generally, and addressing foreign
concerns over China’s ASAT test; and
offering to engage in dialogue with the United
States on mutual space concerns, and become
actively involved in discussions on
establishing international space codes of
conduct and confidence-building measures.17
Harvesting Energy and Creating
Wealth In and From Space
Spacefaring actors should consider revising
and further developing the OST regime as a
key first step when seeking better ways to
harvest energy and create wealth in, and from,
space. Expanding participation in the OST as
17

Bruce W. MacDonald, China, Space Weapons, and U.S.
Security (Council on Foreign Relations, September 2008), 3438.
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recommended above would also be helpful,
but other steps, such as reducing liability
concerns, and clarifying legal issues with
respect to harvesting energy and generating
wealth, are likely to be more effective in
furthering commercial development of space.
Of course, as with security, a range of
objectives and values are in tension and
require considerable effort to change or keep
properly balanced. The OST has been
extremely successful thus far with respect to
its primary objective of precluding replication
of the colonial exploitation that plagued much
of Earth’s history. The international
community should now consider whether the
dangers posed by potential cosmic land grabs
continue to warrant OST interpretations that
may be stifling development of spacepower,
and, if these values are found to have become
imbalanced, how impediments might best be
reduced. Spacefaring actors should again use
an expansive approach to consider how
perceived OST restrictions and the
commercial space sector have evolved and
might be further advanced in a variety of
ways, including reinterpreting the OST regime
itself, becoming more intentional about
developing spacepower, creating space-based
solar power capabilities, and improving export
controls.
While the OST has thus far been unambiguous
and successful in foreclosing sovereignty
claims and the ills of colonization, it has been
less clear and effective with respect to de facto
property rights and other liability and
commercialization issues. OST language,
negotiating history, and subsequent practice
do not preclude some level of commercial
activity in space and on celestial bodies, but
various articles of the OST support different
interpretations about the potential scope and
limitations on this activity. The treaty most
clearly allows those commercial activities that
would be performed to support exploration or
scientific efforts. It is far more problematic

with respect to commercial space activity that
would result in private gain or not somehow
equitably distribute gains among all states.
Even if it were found that commercial
activities would not “appropriate” space
resources, however that might be defined, it
would be difficult to reconcile such activity
with the spirit of the OST regime, especially
since the regime provides no guidance on how
private or unequal gains might be distributed.
In addition to clarifying potential property
rights and wealth distribution mechanisms,
consideration should be given to re-evaluating
liability standards. The 1972 Liability
Convention establish two distinct liability
structures: launching states are absolutely
liable to pay compensation for any damages
caused by space objects on Earth or to aircraft
in flight, but are only liable for damages
caused in space by space objects if found to be
at fault or negligent. A challenge for the
international community is how best to evolve
the existing space law regime based on either
absolute
liability
or
fault/negligence,
depending upon the location of the incident,
into a structure that might provide enough
clarity to help establish liability for damages
in space, and perhaps provide better incentives
for commercial development.18

18

Although Article VII of the OST discusses liability, that
article was further implemented in the Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
commonly referred to as the Liability Convention. Under the
Liability Convention, Article II, a launching state is
absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by
its space object on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in
flight. However, under Articles III and IV, in the event of
damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the
Earth by a space object, the launching state is liable only if
the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom
it is responsible, including commercial companies, under a
negligence standard. See Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (resolution
2777 (XXVI) annex), adopted on 29 November 1971, opened
for signature on 29 March 1972, and entered into force on 1
September 1972.
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Additional interpretation issues stem from the
fact that OST is embedded within a larger
body of international law and that broad
regime is evolving, sometimes in ambiguous
and contradictory ways. Elements within this
larger regime are of unclear and unequal
weight; for example, the Moon Agreement
with its Common Heritage of Mankind
(CHM) approach to communal property rights
and equally shared rewards undoubtedly has
some effect in advancing the CHM principle
in both formal and customary international
law. At the level of formal international law,
however, the Moon Agreement falls well short
of the OST regime due to its lack parties,
especially among major spacefaring states.
Most fundamentally, the current lack of clarity
within space law about property rights and
commercial interests is the result of both space
law
and
space
technology
being
underdeveloped and immature. Of course,
there is also a “chicken-and-egg” factor at
work since actors are discouraged from
undertaking the test cases needed to develop
and mature the regime because of the
immaturity of the regime and their
unwillingness to develop and employ
improved technologies and processes as test
cases in whatever legal processes would be
used to resolve property rights and reward
structures. The most effective way to move
past this significant hurdle would be to create
more clear mechanisms for establishing
property rights and processes by which all
actors, especially commercial actors, could
receive rewards commensurate with the risks
they
undertake.
In
addition,
any
comprehensive re-evaluation of space
property rights and liability concerns should
also consider how these factors are addressed
in analogous regimes, such as the Seabed
Authority in the Law of the Sea Treaty.
Unfortunately, however, there are also several
problems with attempting to draw from these
precedents. First, several of the analogous
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regimes like the Law of the Sea build from
CHM premises in several ways and it is not
clear this approach is entirely applicable or
helpful when attempting to sort through how
the OST should apply to issues like property
rights and reward structures. Second, while
these analogous regimes are undoubtedly
better developed than the OST and have a
significant potential role in providing
precedents, today they are still somewhat
underdeveloped and immature with respect to
their application in difficult areas, such as
property rights and reward structures, again
limiting the current utility of attempting to
draw from these precedents.
Provisions of the OST regime are probably the
most important factors in shaping commercial
space activity, but they are clearly not the only
noteworthy legal and policy factors at work
influencing developments within this sector.
Legacy legal and policy structures developed
during the Cold War were probably adequate
for the amount of commercial space activity
during that period, but it is far from clear they
will be sufficient to address the significant and
sustained increase in commercial space
activity since that time. In the 1960s, the
United States was the first to begin developing
space services, such as communications,
remote sensing, and launch capabilities, but
did so within the government sector. This
approach began to change in the 1980s, first
with the November 1984 Presidential
Determination to allow some commercial
communication services to compete with
Intelsat, and continued with subsequent
policies designed to foster development of a
commercial space sector. By the late 1990s,
commercial space activity worldwide had
outpaced government activity, and although
government space investments remain very
important, they are likely to become
increasingly overshadowed by commercial
activity. It would be helpful if governments,
and the U.S. Government in particular, could
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more explicitly develop and consistently
implement legal structures and long-term
policies that would better define and delineate
between those space activities that ought to be
pursued by the private and public sectors, as
well as more intentionally and consistently
develop the desired degree of international
cooperation in pursuing these objectives.
Other clear commercial and economic
distinctions of the Cold War era have even
more significant implications for the future of
spacepower; whereas the Soviet Union was
only a military superpower, China is a major
U.S. trading partner and an economic
superpower that recently passed Germany to
became the world’s third largest economy, is
poised to pass Japan soon, and is on a path to
become larger than the U.S. economy, perhaps
within only about ten years. Because of its
economic muscle, China can afford to devote
commensurately more resources to its military
capabilities, and will play a more significant
role in structuring the global economic
system. For example, China holds an
estimated $1.4 trillion in foreign assets,
mainly U.S. treasury notes, an amount that
gives it great leverage in the structure of the
system.19
The United States and other major spacefaring
actors lack, but undoubtedly need, much more
open and comprehensive visions for how to
develop spacepower. The process should
continue, become more intentional and
formalized, and be supported by an enduring
organizational structure that includes the most
important stakeholders in the future of
spacepower. Legal structures should be a
foundational
part
of
creating
and
implementing the vision to develop
spacepower, but the approach should be
broader, “focused on opening space as a
19

See James Fallows, “The $1.4 Trillion Question,” The
Atlantic, January/February 2008.

medium for the full spectrum of human
activity and commercial enterprise, and those
actions, which government can take to
promote and enable it, through surveys,
infrastructure development, pre-competitive
technology, and encouraging incentive
structures (prizes, anchor-customer contracts,
and property/exclusivity rights), regulatory
regimes (port authorities, spacecraft licensing,
public-private partnerships), and supporting
services (open interface standards, RDT&E
[research, development, test, and evaluation]
facilities, rescue, etc.).”20 In addition,
consideration should be given to using other
innovative mechanisms and nontraditional
routes to space development, including a
much wider range of federal government
organizations, and the growing number of
state spaceport authorities and other
organizations
developing
needed
infrastructure. Finally, the United States
should make comprehensive and careful
exploration of the potential of space-based
solar power its leading pathfinder in creating a
vision for developing spacepower. Working
towards harvesting this unlimited power
source in economically viable ways will
require development of appropriate supporting
legal structures, particularly with respect to
indemnification and potential public private
partnerships.
Global licensing and export controls for space
technology have often been developed and
implemented
in
inconsistent
and
counterproductive ways. It is understandable
that many states view space technology as a
key strategic resource and are very concerned
about developing, protecting, and preventing
the proliferation of this technology, but the
international community, and the United
States, in particular, needs to find better legal
mechanisms to balance and advance
20

Peter Garretson, “Elements of a 21st century space policy,”
The Space Review, 3 August 2009.
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objectives in this area. Many current problems
with U.S. export controls began after Hughes
and Loral worked with insurance companies
to analyze Chinese launch failures in January
1995 and February 1996. A congressional
review completed in 1998, known as the “Cox
Report,” determined these analyses violated
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR)
by
communicating
technical
information to the Chinese. The 1999 National
Defense Authorization Act transferred export
controls for all satellites and related items
from the Commerce Department to the
Munitions List administered by the State
Department.21 The stringent Munitions List
controls contributed to a severe downturn in
U.S. satellite exports.22 To avoid these
restrictions, foreign satellite manufacturers,
beginning in 2002 with Alcatel Space, now
Thales Alenia Space, and followed by
European Aeronautic Defense and Space
21

The January 1995 failure was a Long March 2E rocket
carrying Hughes-built Apstar 2 spacecraft and the February
1996 failure was a Long March 3B rocket carrying Space
Systems Loral-built Intelsat 708 spacecraft. Representative
Christopher Cox led a six-month long House Select
Committee investigation that produced the “U.S. National
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s
Republic of China” report released on 25 May 1999,
http://www.house.gov/coxreport (accessed November 2009).
In January of 2002, Loral agreed to pay the U.S. government
$20 million to settle the charges of the illegal technology
transfer, and in March of 2003, Boeing agreed to pay $32
million for the role of Hughes, which Boeing acquired in
2000. Requirements for transferring controls back to the
Department of State are in Sections 1513 and 1516 of the
Fiscal Year 1999 National Defense Authorization Act.
Related items are defined as “satellite fuel, ground support
equipment, test equipment, payload adapter or interface
hardware, replacement parts, and non-embedded solid
propellant orbit transfer engines.”
22
Satellite builders claim that their exports dropped 59 percent
in 2000, and that since March 1999 their share of the global
market declined sharply, from 75 percent to 45 percent. See
Evelyn Iritani and Peter Pae, “U.S. Satellite Industry Reeling
Under New Export Controls,” Los Angeles Times, 11
December 2000. According to Space News, 2000 marked the
first time that U.S. firms were awarded fewer contracts for
GEO communications satellites than their European
competitors; the Europeans were ahead 15 to 13. See Peter B.
de Selding and Sam Silverstein, “Europe Bests U.S. in
Satellite Contracts in 2000,” Space News, 15 January 2001.
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(EADS), Surrey Satellite Company, and others
replaced all U.S.-built components on their
satellites to make them “ITAR-free.”23
There are two key reasons why the United
States should move away from the priorities in
its current export control regime. First, an
overly broad approach that tries to guard too
many things dilutes monitoring resources and
actually results in less protection for “crown
jewels” than does a focused approach. Second,
a more open approach is more likely to foster
innovation, spur development of sectors of
comparative
advantage,
and
improve
efficiency and overall economic growth.
Congress and the Obama Administration
should make it a priority to re-evaluate current
U.S. export controls and adjust laws and
policies accordingly. Excellent starting points
are the recently released recommendations for
re-balancing overall U.S. export control
priorities in the congressionally mandated
National Academies of Science (NAS) study.24
In addition, the United States should
implement key recommendations from the
Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) study on the space industrial base,
such as removing from the Munitions List
commercial communications satellite systems,
dedicated subsystems, and components
specifically designed for commercial use.25
23

See Peter B. de Selding, “European Satellite Component
Maker Says it is Dropping U.S. Components Because of
ITAR,” Space News, 13 June 2005; and Douglas Barrie and
Michael A. Taverna, “Specious Relationship,” Aviation Week
& Space Technology, 17 July 2006, 93-96.
24
See National Research Council, Beyond “Fortress
America:” National Security Controls on Science and
Technology in a Globalized World (Washington, DC:
National Academies Press, 2009). With the Obama
Administration and the new congress, as well as former
Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher now confirmed in the key
position of Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, conditions for changing the space
export control laws are the most favorable they have been for
the last decade.
25
“Briefing of the Working Group on the Health of the U.S.
Space Industrial Base and the Impact of Export Controls,”
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Environmental Sustainability
and Survival
Work towards developing space law to
advance
spacepower
and
improve
environmental sustainability and humanity’s
odds for survival faces a number of daunting
challenges, including a high “giggle factor,”
very long timelines that can be beyond our
political and personal awareness, and potential
returns that are uncertain and intangible.
While difficult, work in this area is absolutely
critical since it may hold the key to
humanity’s very survival, and it must be
pursued with all the resources, consistency,
and seriousness it deserves. The quest to
improve space law to support environmental
and survival objectives should focus in three
areas: space debris, environmental monitoring,
and planetary defense.
Human space activity produces many orbital
objects; when these objects no longer serve a
useful function, they are classified as space
debris. Over time, human activity has
generated an increasing amount of debris from
a variety of causes; the number of catalogued
debris objects has gone from about 8,000 to
over 18,000 during the past 20 years.26 The
most serious cause of debris is deliberate
hypervelocity impacts between large objects at
high orbital altitudes, such as the Chinese
direct ascent kinetic energy ASAT weapon
test of January 2007. This test was
dangerously irresponsible and now accounts
for more than 25 percent of all catalogued

(Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
February 2008).
26
Comprehensive and current information about orbital debris
is provided by NASA and the European Space Agency,
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov
and
http://www.esa.int/
esaCP/SEMHDJXJD1E_FeatureWeek_0.html (both accessed
November 2009).

objects in low Earth orbit (LEO).27 If current
trends continue, there is growing risk that
space, and LEO in particular, will become
increasingly unusable. Fortunately, there is
also growing awareness and earnestness
across the international community in
addressing this threat. Overall goals for
spacefaring actors with respect to space debris
include minimizing its creation, while
mitigating and remediating its effects – space
law can play an important role in all these
areas. Key approaches to minimizing creation
of debris are commercial best practices and
evolving regimes, like the IADC voluntary
guidelines adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly in February 2008.
Spacefaring actors also need to consider
mechanisms to transition these voluntary
guidelines into more binding standards and
ways to impose specific costs, such as
sanctions or fines on actors that negligently or
deliberately create long-lived debris. Fines
could be applied towards efforts to further
develop and educate spacefaring actors about
the debris mitigation regime, as well as to
create and implement remediation techniques.
An additional potential source of funding for
mitigation and remediation would be
27

See “Fengyun 1-C Debris: Two Years Later,” Orbital
Debris Quarterly News 13: 1 (2009): 2. The Orbital Debris
Quarterly is published by NASA Orbital Debris Program
Office. As a result of the 11 January 2007 Chinese ASAT test,
the U.S. Space Surveillance Network has catalogued 2,378
pieces of debris with diameters greater than five centimeters,
is tracking 400 additional debris objects that are not yet
catalogued, and estimates the test created more than 150,000
pieces of debris larger than one square centimeter.
Unfortunately, less than two percent of this debris has reentered the atmosphere so far, and it is estimated that many
pieces will remain in orbit for decades and some for more
than a century. By contrast, destruction of the inoperative
USA-193 satellite by the U.S. on 21 February 2008 occurred
at a much lower altitude and did not produce long lived
debris; the last piece of catalogued debris from this intercept
re-entered on 9 October 2008. On the engagement of USA193, see, in particular, James Oberg, “OPERATION BURNT
FROST: Five Myths About the Satellite Smashup,” NBC
News Analysis, 27 February 2008, and James E. Oberg,
“Down in Flames: Media “Space Experts” Flub the ShootDown Story,” The New Atlantis 24 (Spring 2009): 120-129.
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establishing auctions for the radio frequency
spectrum controlled by the ITU that would be
analogous to the spectrum auctions conducted
at the national level by organizations like the
U.S. Federal Communications Commission.
Finally, it must be emphasized that techniques
for remediating debris using lasers or other
methods are likely to have significant
potential as ASAT weapons, and very careful
international consideration should be given to
how and by whom such systems are operated.
Space provides a unique location to monitor,
and potentially remediate, Earth’s climate. It
is the only location from which simultaneous
in-situ observations of Earth’s climate activity
can be conducted, and such observations are
essential to developing a long-term
understanding of potential changes in our
biosphere. Because so much is riding on our
understanding of the global climate and our
potential responses to perceived changes, it is
particularly important to apply apolitical
standards in getting the science right and
controlling for known space effects, like solar
cycles, when making these observations. If
fears about global warming are correct, and
the global community wishes to take active
measures to remediate these effects, space also
provides a unique location to operate
remediation options, such as orbital solar
shades.
It is also important that the United States and
all spacefaring actors think more creatively
about using spacepower to transcend
traditional and emerging threats to our
survival. Parts of space law can help to
illuminate paths towards, and develop
incentives, to create a better future. Space,
perhaps more than any other medium, is
inherently linked to humanity’s future and
very survival. We need to link these ideas
together and better articulate ways spacepower
can light a path towards genuinely cooperative
approaches for protecting the Earth and space
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environments from cataclysmic events, such
as large objects that may collide with Earth or
gamma ray bursts that may have the potential
to render huge swaths of space uninhabitable.
Better knowledge about known threats, such
as Near Earth Objects (NEOs), is being
developed, but more urgency is required. All
predicted near approaches and possible NEO
impacts, such as the asteroid Apophis on 13
April 2029, ought to
Space be
seen
as
provides a opportunities
since
unique they provide critical
location to real-world tests for our
monitor, and ability to be proactive
potentially in developing effective
precision tracking and
remediate, NEO
mitigation
Earth’s capabilities. In the
climate. near term, it is most
important for national
and international organizations to be
specifically charged with and resourced to
develop better understanding of NEO threats
and mitigation techniques that can be
effectively applied against likely impacts.
Ultimately, however, we cannot know of, or
effectively plan for, all potential threats to
Earth, but should pursue a multidimensional
approach to develop capabilities to improve
our odds for survival and one day become a
multi-planetary species.
Conclusion
There will be inevitable missteps, setbacks,
and unintended consequences as we refine
space law to improve our quest for sustainable
space security, generate wealth in and from
space, and protect the Earth and space
environments. The inexorable laws of physics
and of human interaction indicate that we will
create the best opportunities for success in
improving space law by beginning long-term,
patient work now, rather than crash programs
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later. This long-term, patient approach will
allow the best prospects for space law to
provide a solid foundation for the peaceful
advancement of spacepower.

Role and Identity for Europe in Space Security
Wolfgang Rathgeber and Nina-Louisa Remuss
European Space Policy Institute
This article is reprinted here with permission from the authors. See “Executive Summary” in Wolfgang Rathgeber and NinaLouisa Remuss, Space Security: A Formative Role and Principled Identity for Europe (European Space Policy Institute Report
16, January 2009).

Modern societies have become heavily
dependent on space and its applications. As a
consequence, the issue of security in space is
increasingly being recognized as critical for
humankind. This development is reinforced by
events like the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT)
test in January 2007. Various alternatives to
support the peaceful uses of space, to promote
international cooperation, and to prevent an
arms race in outer space are under discussion.
These attempts occasionally lack support by
space actors that emphasize the right to act
freely when national security concerns are at
stake. Possible routes forward include legally
binding
treaties,
confidence
building
measures, and soft law, such as codes of
conduct or rules of the road.
The respective efforts cannot be seen isolated
from the political boundary conditions, like
existing national space security doctrines. To
devise recommendations for action, this
background needs to be taken into account.
Europe will have to decide upon its own
position, to come up with a distinct strategy,
and to find suitable ways of implementing its
approach to space security. While identifying
distinct elements of a possible European
doctrine, this article puts Europe in the context
of the existing doctrines of other spacefaring
countries. In doing so, it goes beyond the mere
provision of an internal view, providing a
detailed analysis of the legal framework and
current proposals under negotiations. Taking,
on the one hand, a political sciences approach
by using international relations theories to

explain differences in doctrines, the paper, on
the
other
hand,
offers
concrete
recommendations addressed to policy makers.
It aims at showing how Europe should
position itself on the international scene.
Existing National Security
Space Doctrines
Doctrines, be they implicit or explicit,
demonstrate national goals and security
objectives. Different strategies can be chosen
to achieve these aims. To prevent an arms
race, the possible reasons for the development
of an arms race have to be analyzed. Theories
offering explanations can be subdivided into
theories focusing on external or on internal
factors, i.e., factors that lie outside or inside
the states participating in an arms race.
The U.S. is the only spacefaring country with
an explicit space policy. Its plans are
evidenced by the national space policies, the
latest formal one from 2006, as well as by
other documents, such as the Air Force Space
Command’s Vision 2020 or the National
Security Strategy. In the Cold War era, the
U.S. saw space as a sanctuary, i.e., as a
surveillance medium and strived for space
control – not on a permanent basis, but in case
of conflict. In the Reagan Administration,
there was a move towards considering space
as another area for military operations. After
9/11, security aspects of space were
emphasized over civil and scientific ones.
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While still pursuing the concept of space
control, which may well go beyond the right
of self-defense, and asserting a “specific right”
for itself, the U.S. also stresses the importance
of compliance to the existing international
legal framework. However, the fact that the
U.S. opposes legal regimes that might infringe
on its right of using and accessing outer space
has impacts on the process of preventing an
arms race in space. It remains to be seen,
which approach the Obama Administration
will take.
Russia does not have an explicit space
doctrine. One of the main rationales for
Russian space activities is national security. In
the early 1970s, the former Soviet Union had
refrained
from
multilateral efforts Europe… has
to
prohibit
the only recently
development
or regarded space
deployment
of
as a strategic
space weapons. In
that period, it had asset.
developed
space
weapons, such as ASATs. At the beginning of
the 1980s, the Soviet Union shifted its policy
and proposed a multilateral treaty banning
space weapons in the framework of the United
Nations. It also called for a total
demilitarization of outer space. Russia
continues this trend, calling for unhindered
space exploration and preservation of space as
a sanctuary. At the same time, it has expressed
concerns that attacks on its early warning
systems would represent a direct threat to its
security.
While China’s space objectives are stated
openly, its military space doctrine is not
published. Thus, there is no explicit space
policy doctrine. The Standing Committee of
the National People’s Congress and the
Central Military Commission define national
and strategic objectives, and policies and
doctrines are clarified by the relevant

bureaucratic actors through speeches, white
papers, and other instruments. The 2006
White Paper on Space Activities states
national security as a main objective, besides
the utilization of space for peaceful purposes.
The principle of independence is also declared
a fundamental policy. Further indications on
its space doctrine can be found in China’s
White Papers on National Defense. China
emphasizes the importance of securing
information
dominance.
To
avoid
vulnerability, it refrains from increasing
military reliance on space assets. Concerns
about China’s real space intentions were
raised by its ASAT activity in 2007. At the
international stage, the official Chinese
position it that space security will be
undermined by the weaponization of space.
Consequently, China is one of the key
proponents of negotiating a multilateral arms
control treaty within the Prevention of an
Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) talks at
the
United
Nations
Conference
on
Disarmament (UNCD). In this context, it lines
up with Russia. There are different political
theories to explain this alliance.
Towards a European
Space Security Identity

Europe as a whole has only recently regarded
space as a strategic asset. Looking at existing
space policy documents, it is only possible to
distinguish elements of a European space
security identity. Space activities in Europe
are carried out by multiple actors at different
levels: (1) the overall European level with the
European
Union
(EU);
(2)
the
intergovernmental
organizations,
e.g.,
European Space Agency (ESA) and the
European Organization for the Exploitation of
Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT); and
(3) the Member State level with the national
space actors.
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The EU as the central political authority at the
European level has begun to get involved.
ESA is the Space Agency of Europe.
EUMETSAT provides its members and
cooperating states with Earth observation data
and weather information. A major part of its
data goes to defense-related institutions. Other
European organizations and bodies relevant
for space and security exist as well. All these
institutions are complemented by national
projects that are sometimes carried out in
bilateral or multilateral cooperation outside
the official European structures. A key role is
played by the Member States and their space
policies.
A number of documents show the ongoing
process of developing a European approach to
space security. In this regard, the Three Wise
Men Report of 2000 stated that the European
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) are
incomplete without a space component. The
EU-ESA Framework agreement in 2004 called
on both sides to take into account the security
dimension of space
…the role that
technologies
and
infrastructures.
The Europe takes
Council of the EU in will need to be
2004 and 2005 called formative… it
for a roadmap for the will have to
development
of actively
effective and coherent
influence the
space
capabilities
necessary for ESDP situation of
and specified the steps space security
needed therefore. The by normative
European
Space action…
Policy
of
2007
contained a distinct chapter on security and
defense and called for protection of space
infrastructure. The 2008 von Wogau Report
adopted by the European Parliament insists
that European space policy must not
contribute to militarization or weaponization
of space. The EU is also involved in setting up
a Code of Conduct for sustainable space
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activities. In the long run, Europe will have to
come up with a Europeans Space Security
Strategy (E3S). Such a strategy can contribute
to shaping a European identity in space
security,
which
should
comprise
a
corresponding doctrine as well.
Current Negotiations
Several proposals have been made to negotiate
a space weapons ban with Canada, China, and
Russia taking the lead, and the U.S. as a major
spacefaring nation being involved in the
debate. These main players link their position
in this domain to their larger strategic
positions, relationships and their national
space security doctrine. Current proposals can
broadly be divided into three categories: (1)
the treaty approach; (2) the code of conduct
approach; and (3) alternative ideas, including
transparency and confidence building
measures and the proposal for comprehensive
space traffic management.
China and Russia have been strong advocates
of a treaty on the peaceful use of outer space
in the past. Apart from negotiating a legally
binding treaty there is the option of adopting a
code of conduct, which can be regarded as a
single instrument or an interim solution, i.e.,
elemental to a future treaty. Alternatively, one
of the often referred to all-encompassing
solutions is the proposal of a comprehensive
space traffic management regime with the
most prominent proponent being the
International Academy of Astronautics.
Thereafter, space traffic management is “a set
of technical and regulatory provisions for
guaranteeing safe access to outer space,
operation in outer space and return from outer
space to Earth free from physical or radio
frequency interference.” Space traffic
management is not tackling single issues, but
concerns the regulation of space activities as a
comprehensive
concept.
Space
traffic
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management could be complimentary to
existing or future legal regulations, solving the
existing deadlock in the UNCD.
Assessing a Role for Europe
on the International Scene
The situation described above leaves room for
several options to move forward. Accordingly,
one could simply neglect the threat of an arms
race and avoid any action. Another option
would be to amend the existing legal structure.
A third possibility is to introduce confidence
building measures and a code of conduct. A
fourth way is the negotiation of a legally
binding treaty. Given these options, the
question arises in more specific terms, which
road the EU should take. Conceptualizing
Europe’s international role does not mean
outlining a single role or route Europe does
adopt or might follow. Considerations can be
broken down into three possible scenarios for
Europe shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Scenarios for Europe’s International Role.

The discussion above showed the future
possibilities and roads for the EU to take. The
introduction of the code of conduct by the EU
might already indicate a certain future
direction. It increases the EU’s position in the
space debate by indicating its willingness and

ability to deal with sensitive questions even in
the face of opposition from key partners.
needs to shape its identity in space security.
This identity has to correspond to the values,
goals, and policies of the EU.
All in all, the role that Europe takes will need
to be formative, i.e., it will have to actively
influence the situation of space security by
normative action instead of just handling or
administrating the given status quo that has
been set by others. Europe should pursue
certain goals in this regard. Such goals follow
from values that have been laid down in
various documents, like the European Security
Strategy. They include: multilateralism,
emphasizing international cooperation and
diplomacy; combining civilian and military
means; and promoting the rule of law. An
identity formed by these underlying values is a
principled one.
Based on such an approach, Europe should
take into consideration the following policy
recommendations: formulate a strategy and
develop a space identity in line with the
European Security Strategy,
corresponding to the values,
goals and policies of the EU;
decide on the policy making
and decision making processes
and introduce key mechanisms
to oversee the European Space
Policy;
clarify
the
organizational and institutional
questions relating to space and
Common Foreign and Security
Policy / ESDP, e.g., in regard to
ESA and EDA; establish a
European Space Situational Awareness
System; increase investments for space
programs, research and development; move
away from a purely State focused actor
perception; and establish a coordinated space
dialogue with international partners.
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Space Situational Awareness Workshop
The goal of the Space Situational Awareness
workshops is to bring together stakeholders
interested in space situational awareness
(SSA). This includes practitioners, users of
data, representatives of industry and the
military,
the
scientific
community,
international organizations, and the satellitetracking community. These stakeholders
discussed how needs are changing with SSA,
what improvements in SSA capabilities can be
achieved in the near-term to medium-term,
and how various stakeholder communities
might better interact to draw on each other’s
strengths.
The first workshop was held in 2006. It was
co-sponsored by the World Security Institute’s
Center for Defense
Information.
A …frequency
workshop report can of
be
found
at:
conjunctions
http://www.cdi.org/PD
is likely
Fs/SSAConference_sc
reen.pdf. The second greater than
workshop was hosted one can
by Inmarsat in 2007 model or
and was co-sponsored anticipate.
by the World Security
Institute’s Center for Defense Information and
the Secure World Foundation. A summary of
the discussions that took place at this
workshop was published in Space and
Defense 2: 1 (2008).
The summary provided here covers the third
workshop held in 2009. This workshop was
hosted by Intelsat and was co-sponsored by
the World Security Institute’s Center for
Defense Information, the Secure World
Foundation, and the George C. Marshall
Institute. Areas of focus included: national and
international perspectives on SSA; the
challenges of the space environment;

governance issues related to safe and
responsible
behavior
in
the
space
environment; the state of SSA data sharing
and the U.S. Commercial and Foreign Entities
(CFE) Program; concepts and capabilities for
improved SSA data sharing; and new
opportunities in SSA.
At the 2009 SSA workshop, consensus
emerged among all participants on the
principal of data sharing. In this regard, the
workshop served as a useful forum for
dialogue on SSA data sharing among military,
industry, academic, and think-tank experts
from the U.S., Europe, and Russia.
Participants viewed the recent the IridiumCosmos collision of 10 February 20091 as a
watershed event on the need for better data
sharing. It was recognized at the workshop
that orbital conjunctions risks are always
present. Further, the fact that statistical
analysis of possible conjunctions are based on
a short historical time frame and on
incomplete data suggests that the frequency of
conjunctions is likely greater than one can
model or anticipate.
The Iridium-Cosmos collision also pointed to
one dilemma of mitigation based on
maneuvering an active satellite. The point was
made at the workshop that, given uncertainty
in predicting an orbital conjunction, if one was
to maneuver a space asset there remained the
possibility, nonetheless, that a collision could
1

On 10 February 2009, the Iridium 33 and Cosmos 2251
communications satellites collided over northern Siberia. The
impact between the Iridium Satellite LLC-owned satellite and
the 16-year-old satellite launched by the Russian government
occurred at a closing speed of well over 15,000 mph at
approximately 490 miles above the face of the Earth. The low
Earth orbit location of the collision contains many other
active satellites that could be at risk from the resulting orbital
debris. See http://www.stk.com/corporate/mediaCenter/news/
iridium-cosmos (accessed November 2009).
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still take place. This, in turn, would likely
establish fault for liability on the party that
undertook the maneuvering – the Liability
Convention established the principal of faultbased liability for damages in space. A
number of issues in the context of the IridiumCosmos collision were discussed: at what
point do you take action to maneuver a space
asset from a possible conjunction; whose
obligation is it to maneuver, especially when a
commercial provider owns and operates the
space asset; and what are the resultant liability
issues?
In terms of SSA data sharing, two specific
cases were discussed at the workshop. One
case concerned the U.S. CFE program for
SSA data sharing. It was noted that since the
inception of CFE in 2004, the program
evolved from a more conservative and
controlling view on
data sharing to a more …openness
liberal and open view among U.S.
on
data
sharing. military
Indicative of this leaders for
evolution
is
the European
openness among U.S.
cooperation
military leaders for
European cooperation and
and involvement in involvement
SSA data sharing as in SSA data
well
as
using sharing…
European assets to
augment
SSA
capabilities of the U.S. military. The second
case of data sharing discussed at the workshop
dealt with the efforts of commercial satellite
providers to develop and establish SSA data
sharing arrangements among key commercial
telecommunication satellite operators. In
addition to a discussion on some of the
specifics of this data sharing arrangement,
there was a discussion on ways to expand the
sharing arrangement to include the U.S.
military.
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Summer Space Seminar
The Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense
Studies organized the Summer Space Seminar
since 2007 to advance two principal goals: (1)
to foster an education and interest in the
interdisciplinary areas of space with the intent
to develop space professionals; and (2) to
develop a network of relations across civil,
commercial, and military space professionals
that will likely emerge from the participants.
The Summer Space Seminar exposes
participants to the breadth and depth of space
activities in the civil, commercial, and military
areas. The relationships among these areas are
explored across a number of perspectives –
participants are exposed to the technology and
science of space activities, followed by
discussions on the political, legal, economic,
and social aspects that influence the
development and application of the various
civil, commercial, and military space
activities. The emphasis is on exchanges
among the participants.
The 2009 Seminar combined site visits with
moderated roundtable discussions that covered
a number of topics.



Military space doctrine and mission areas
with a briefing at Air Force Space
Command.



Small satellite development program at the
U.S. Air Force Academy.



Commercial space sector programs in
space launch and remote sensing with site
visits to United Launch Alliance and
Digital Globe facilities.



Civil space science programs with site
visits to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory,
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center,
and the Johns Hopkins University’s
Applied Physics Laboratory.



Space policy roundtable discussions on
space weaponization, NATO space
cooperation, the notion of space as a
contested or a cooperative environment,
export controls, international space
cooperation, interagency processes, and
national space policy formulation and
implementation.



Security space, including space situational
awareness, space launch, and space
acquisition
operations,
satellite
development, and science and technology
research with site visits to: Vandenberg
Air Force Base, Space and Missile
Systems Center, Boeing, Northrop
Grumman, and the Naval Research
Laboratory.

The Summer Space Seminar is directed
toward bringing together a broad group of
future space professionals to lay a foundation
for a future space policy community in the
military, civilian government, and private
sectors. Participants in the program include
students from the U.S. Air Force Academy,
U.S. Naval Academy, U.S. Military Academy,
George Washington University, and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.



New space companies with a site visit to
Space X facilities where the Falcon launch
vehicles are developed.

For some in the group, the Seminar was their
first exposure to the role and importance of
space. For others in the group, it exposed them
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to areas that affect space beyond technology
and science, like policy, law, and economics.
The Seminar served as useful forum for
further professional development given that
several of the participants worked, or are
currently employed, as space professionals.
During the Seminar, a great deal of learning
and socialization took place among the
participants that will serve to meet the goal to
inform, and to build connections between
future space professionals.
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Asia, Space, and Strategy Workshop
In 2006, the Eisenhower Center for Space and
Defense Studies held its first Asia, Space, and
Strategy workshop. This effort brought
together US, Canadian, and European experts
and policy makers from the military, civilian
government, universities, think-tanks, and the
private sectors to discuss the implications of
current and future Chinese space policy and
investigate areas of possible Sino-U.S.
cooperation and competition in space.
Beginning in 2007, an invitation was extended
to include Chinese academics in the
discussions. Chinese participation has
increased each year since then, with four
attendees from China at the 2009 workshop in
Vancouver, Canada.
The fourth workshop of 2009 was broadened
to include other space powers in the AsiaPacific region. For the first time in the
workshop series, representatives from
Australia and Japan took part. The workshop
focused on common interests, which
spacefaring countries of the Pacific Basin
have in the creation of a stable, predictable,
and mutually beneficial environment in space.
Workshop topics ranged from: economic and
political goals for the use of space; improving
the safety and stability of the space
environment;
deterrence
and
defense
concepts; and arms control and verification. A
summary of the 2009 workshop follows
below. The earlier summaries of the National
Space Forum 2009 in this issue of Space and
Defense, especially the panel sessions on
“Threat Assessments and the Space Domain”
and “China’s Role in Space,” highlighted as
well relevant aspects of the discussions at the
2009 Asia, Space, and Strategy Workshop.
There was agreement that the next stage of the
workshop series should move toward the
development of space lexicon between the

U.S. and China as a basis for reaching
common understandings. This is essential as it
was reiterated at this workshop that
differences do exist on important concepts,
like deterrence, reassurance, and transparency.
The Chinese tend to view deterrence more
aggressively than the U.S. There is no
corollary concept of deterrence in Chinese
based on the U.S. view that deterrence
contributes to stability
…differences and to reassure an
do exist on adversary; and there is
important no
concept
of
and
concepts, like reassurance
deterrence, transparency, as was
reassurance, noted in previous
workshops. To add,
and transparency translates
transparency. into “espionage” in
Mandarin
Chinese.
Concomitantly, participants at the workshop
expressed the view that differences on these
concepts should not become issues between
the U.S. and China. Dialogue on space
cooperation can advance through developing
for discussion symmetrical and equal
cooperative arrangements.

The Chinese present at the meeting primarily
expressed views on space security, space
economics,
and
international
space
cooperation. In the area of security, it was
stated that China advances its own capacity in
space and it reacts to what it sees as foreign
interference from others, especially the United
States. This led to an emboldened China in the
military space arena. With regard to a military
space role, China has a complicated attitude
towards space deterrence. The Chinese
military refers to deterrence more aggressively
and as means to address threats, but political
leaders tend to focus on self-defense and
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retaliation. In the context of threats, Taiwan is
the central issue.
The Chinese present at the workshop
emphasized that China is focused on space as
a global business. Commercial space is a
means by which China cooperates with other
states and is a vehicle for soft power
projection, in particular with developing states
in Africa. It was also
China is
remarked how China sees
growing links, and mutual focused on
influence, between the space as a
commercial and military global
sectors of space. Albeit, business.
the military has its own
logic and own incentives, and the commercial
sector is more open to the world, the Chinese
expressed the view that military knowledge of
international norms as to legitimate behavior
in the space domain would be a good thing.
In the area of cooperation, China is interested
to cooperate with NASA in civil space science
and in commercial space launch with U.S.
satellite manufacturers. The Chinese also
suggested that China will seek to join the
International Space Station (ISS) program.
Lunar science and plans for future human
missions to the Moon offer possible other
areas of cooperation for the Chinese with the
U.S. and other Asian space powers, such as
Japan and India.
Discussed as well at the workshop were issues
related to cooperation in standard setting for
space technology. One participant that is
involved in this area spoke of problems in
cooperation as Chinese involvement takes
place through a joint government-industry
group that the U.S. sees a vehicle for
technology transfer to military programs in
China. This is an issue, yet U.S. nonparticipation will not prevent the creation of
standards, only of a U.S. voice in setting those
standards. To add to these problems, within

China there is not enough discussion on this
subject, especially in scientific and technical
circles.
Lastly, in the session on space deterrence a
number of issues were identified: (1) what is
deterrence; (2) what is the nature of the
conflict; (3) what is the focus; and (4) what is
the nature of the adversary? These issues are
further highlighted below as discussed during
the workshop.
1. The purpose of deterrence is to make the
other side change their actions. As such,
one needs to know what the enemy is
thinking, and how they think. Deterrence
by denial was more protection oriented,
compared with deterrence through
punishment. But today, there are changes
in
emphasis.
Deterrence
through
punishment was a key in the Cold War. It
rested on credibility and will. But now,
deterrence through denial is increasingly
important, yet it makes deterrence more
difficult.
2. The Cold War focused on nuclear arms,
and specifically global nuclear war. The
fear was of deterrence failure, especially in
the shadow of all-out nuclear war. Today,
there is an absence of these concerns.
Space is seen as a case of extended
deterrence. Ironically, the potential for
failure of deterrence, however, may have
risen.
3. The previous focus of the Cold War was
on nuclear weapons. Now, space security
issues are much more varied. The weapons
and means are much broader, while the
strategic context is very different. It is
hard to deter through punishment,
especially since there is not a symmetric
deterrence relationship in space.
4. Punishment and credibility require
defining expectations of adversary
behavior. There were rational actor
assumptions during the Cold War. Today,
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there are multiple actors, more issues with
denial, and more questions on means of
deterrence. The shift from the Cold War,
at least in the U.S., is towards general
deterrence, rather than an adversaryspecific deterrence posture.
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Transatlantic Space Cooperation Workshop
In 2008, the Eisenhower Center for Space and
Defense Studies established the Transatlantic
Space Cooperation Workshop series. This
workshop series brings together a community
of scholars and experts from the United States
and Europe, including the European Union
(EU), European Space Agency (ESA), and
NATO, to share lessons learned, debate, and
network on joint priorities in the civil,
security, and commercial space.
The first workshop was held in Brussels,
Belgium in June 2008. Participants in this
workshop examined U.S., European, and EU
security space priorities, and considered
NATO’s space role. Discussions began with
an opening panel where senior U.S, EU, and
NATO officials briefed participants on current
security space priorities before participants
explored issues more in-depth. The goal of the
workshop was to educate senior leadership
from the U.S., EU, and NATO on
philosophies and strategies for collective
space security and deterrence in the 21st
century. The workshop was successful in
initiating
dialogue
on
harmonizing
transatlantic security space strategies.
The second workshop was held in Berlin,
Germany in September 2009. The 2009
workshop fostered dialogue regarding the
potential for greater cooperation across the
Atlantic to make the most efficient use of
capabilities where possible across the civil,
security, and commercial space areas. Issues
discussed at the 2009 workshop included:
developments over the past year in
transatlantic space cooperation; joint priorities
in protection of critical space infrastructure;
transatlantic
cooperation
on
Earth
observations for security and stability; and
future avenues for advancing transatlantic
cooperation.

Within this context, workshop participants
discussed approaches to transatlantic space
cooperation based on establishing best
practices for responsible spacefaring activities,
such as practices of control and operations of
space assets, and mitigating orbital debris.
There were as well
…limited discussions on the
budgets for common need for
data
space activities advancing
coordination
and
in relation to sharing in Earth
demands on observation programs.
programs will Participants expressed
facilitate the view, in particular
greater those form Europe,
cooperation that the multilateral
preferences of the
between the United States Obama
U.S. and Administration offer
Europe... an opportunity to reexamine ways to
advance transatlantic space cooperation in
terms of sharing information, data, and
capabilities. In this regard, there was the
realization among participants on both sides of
the Atlantic that limited budgets for space
activities in relation to demands on programs
will facilitate greater cooperation between the
U.S. and Europe across the different space
sectors.1

1

There was little focus during the 2009 workshop on military
space cooperation between the U.S. and Europe. And, there
was little attention to a possible role of NATO in this context.
Europe is not well synchronized in the area of military space
limiting military space cooperation with the U.S.
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